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Abstract

Decisions that are generally considered to be determined by memory (memorial
decisions) are influenced by factors beyond just our memory. Our perceptions, desires,
preconceived notions and our actual memory all influence how we utilize our memories in order
make decisions and our general ability to navigate our world. For example, consider trying to
identify former high school classmates at your high school reunion vs. at a random location
outside your hometown. Your memory for the former high school classmates is the same
between these two scenarios, but your expectations are not. Thus, it is intuitive to assume that
your expectations may provide a differential influence on your behavior between these two
scenarios. This can be thought of as a difference in biases in the sense that you are biased to
assume attendees at your high school reunion are former high school classmates irrespective of
encountering any specific attendee. Now imagine another scenario wherein your former
classmates always wear your high school colors. If you encounter a person wearing these colors,
you may use that as strong evidence that they are former classmates. These scenarios are meant
to represent two different types of biases that influence memorial decisions, herein referred to as
response and stimulus bias, respectively. Response bias refers to a bias in favor of one response
option over the other regardless of the evidence and stimulus bias refers to overweighting certain
evidence as being in favor of one response options over the other. The reunion scenario depicts
response bias because the bias is present regardless of the information provided by your
experience at the reunion. The high school colors scenario depicts stimulus bias because the
perception of the school colors is necessary to bias your judgement toward assuming the wearer
is a high school classmate. Much research has focused on understanding the variety of factors
that contribute to memorial decisions. The current project is designed to scrutinize and expand

upon the current understanding of the influence of bias in simple memorial decisions. To that
end, I first provide an overview of bias in simple memorial decisions in the context of traditional
metrics including Signal Detection Theory (SDT) and The Diffusion Model (DM). I propose an
alternate analysis framework utilizing the response time predictions made by the DM and
provide converging evidence from an underutilized metric, delta plots, which provide more
information about the dynamics of the decision than do traditional metrics. Finally, I end with a
discussion and summary of findings with proposals for the field regarding how to conceptualize
bias in simple memorial decisions.
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Part 1: Introduction
Episodic memory refers to what might be referred to as “conscious” recollection or
recognition of events, people, ideas and places from our past. Fundamentally, episodic memory
encompasses the phenomenon of mental states, once present in consciousness disappearing from
our awareness but not absolutely ceasing to exist, instead being stored in what we consider to be
our episodic memory (Ebbinghaus, 1885).
One approach to studying episodic memory consists of examining how and when it fails
and to interpret the various associated factors. Along with the factors associated with failed and
successful memory; much research also considers this in the context of the time course of the
associated responses (i.e., how long did it take to produce a response, and was the response
accurate) (Sternberg, 1975).
There is a plethora of factors that influence the function of our episodic memory. For
example, Atkinson & Shiffrin (1968) made a fundamental contribution when postulating that
rehearsing information in our short-term memory increases the probability that this information
will be stored into our long-term memory. Craik & Lockhart (1972) proposed that there are two
different types of rehearsal, Type I and type II. Type I rehearsal refers to simply repeating the
information in short-term memory. Type II refers to a more complex form of rehearsal where one
elaborates on the meaning of the information. The idea is that when rehearsing information in
way that is more complex and meaningful, the information is better remembered. Baddeley
(1978) rightly took issue with the circular logic of this claim. In summary, the only evidence of a
Type II level of rehearsal was better performance in a given memorial experiment. While
separating levels of rehearsal into distinct categorizes may have been a misstep, the perspective
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that our memory should be considered in the context of the interconnection between information
is an incredibly important step forward. Said another way, memories should not be considered in
isolation, instead, they should be considered as organized and interconnected. For example,
Bousfield (1953) presented a list of 60 - items from a few different categories (i.e., 15 animals,
15 vegetables) and presented them in random order. While presented in random order, the items
tended to be recalled in clusters based on their category membership, indicating order within our
memorial process.
Tulving (1962) showed that predefined categorized information is not required for
memory to become ordered. He tasked participants with recalling a list of unrelated words. These
words were presented multiple times to participants, in a different order each time. Tulving
discovered that the order that items were recalled were consistent across multiple study-test
blocks regardless of the presentation order. Tulving deemed this phenomenon subjective
organization, the finding that people organize information even without being given any external
structure to base the memory structure. Thus, it isn’t that organization of memory happens only
in certain circumstances, it appears to be a fundamental aspect of the structure of our memory. If
so, what factors dictate the relationship between information in memory?
Underwood & Postman (1960) showed that when tasking participants with studying lists
of words in pairs (e.g., each word from list A is paired with a member with list B or C), studying
lists which had multiple studied associations (A-B and A-C lists) interfered with each other in a
proactive and retroactive way. Thus, new associations seem to interfere with old associations and
vice versa. However, these were laboratory induced associations. Slamecka (1966) expanded on
this design and showed that if participants were asked to first create their own associations with
A list words, these associations were not interfered with after studying A-B and A-C lists.
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Slamecka refers to the participant created associations as “natural associations,” and proposed
that these associations were not unlearned, but were simply inhibited when participants were
tasked with learning other, laboratory induced associations. To summarize, weak, in this case
laboratory induced, associations are subject to interference. But self-determined associations are
strong, and probably very difficult to forget. That being said, they can be inhibited if they are not
relevant in the current context, this is evidenced by the lack of participants responding with selfdetermined associations when tasked with remembering any of the laboratory induced
associations.
Schulman (1974) added to our understanding of the factors that result in strong memorial
associations. He presented participants with queries that were structured in a way that made them
sensible (e.g., Is a corkscrew an opener?) or insensible (e.g., Is spinach ecstatic?) and surprised
participants with various memory tests using one word as a cue and the other to be remembered
(e.g., which keyword was presented with corkscrew?). He found words from the sensible queries
were remembered far better than those from the insensible queries. To summarize, words that
make sense together are better associated with each other in memory.
Response and Stimulus Bias
This review of the literature shows several cognitive biases or situations where human
cognition produces a representation of the world that is not a perfect replica but instead
influenced by other factors. Next, I focus on two biases, response bias and stimulus bias, in order
to inform on how these biases influence our memorial processes in the context of episodic
recognition memory.
Response bias refers to the propensity to prefer or “lean to” one response option over the
other response option. There are many reasons for response bias to occur. For instance, in certain
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circumstances, people tend to respond with the option that they believe is socially desirable, in
order to in some way present a favorable image of themselves (Johnson & Fendrich, 2005). For
example, the desire to be represented as someone with good memory results in a response bias in
favor of the “old” option compared to a “new” option. Response bias could also be indicative of
a strategy used by the responder which can be induced through experiment instructions (Egan,
1958). This is evidenced by the fact that using payoff schedules that encourage “old” or “new”
result in more of the encouraged response (e.g., Healy & Kubovy, 1978; Van Zandt, 2000), or
manipulating the proportion of studied items at test influences the rate of responding “old” (e.g.,
Van Zandt, 2000). There is also evidence that response bias is in part a function of a cognitive
trait that results in biased responding. This was shown by presenting participants with a variety
of tasks at different times and finding that response bias varied between people but was quite
stable within individuals across tests (Kantner & Lindsay, 2012). But generally speaking,
response bias occurs when an individual expects that one response is more likely to be correct
(e.g., because it’s more probable) or more valuable (e.g., because a false positive is less
indicative of poor memory than a false negative).
Stimulus bias refers to being biased in favor of one response over another based on
certain components of stimuli and how they are evaluated relative to the response options. For
example, if I study a set of male faces and I notice that many of them have mustaches, when
being tested, I might overweight the evidence of a mustache as evidence in favor of an “old”
response. Dougal & Rotello (2007) showed that studying emotional content biases responders in
favor of the “old” response when being tested on this content. Thus, the emotional nature of the
items is used as evidence that the word is studied. Insight into this phenomenon comes from
Fuzzy trace theory. Fuzzy trace theory posits that two independent memory traces are encoded as
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a part of every memorial event. These traces are considered gist and verbatim traces. Gist
memory traces are comprised of a “fuzzy” representation of the underlying meaning or structural
form of any given memorial event. Verbatim memory traces are exact representations of the
surface level features of the event (Reyna & Brainerd, 1995). Regardless of the specific
predictions made from the perspective of fuzzy trace theory, the purpose of its inclusion here is
simply as a way to offer the idea that some information contained in any given stimulus is unique
to that stimulus, and other information can be more general, applying to a variety or category of
stimuli. These types of information can be combined in different ways to reach a single decision
about whether an item or event is old or new.
Reaching a decision about whether an item or event is old or new boils down to two
questions; what constitutes memorial strength, and how strong does a memory have to be in
order to elicit an old response. For the present purpose, “memory strength” can be considered as
all information in favor of the decision that an encountered stimulus has been previously
encountered. This includes the aforementioned gist and verbatim information, and is agnostic
regarding whether the memory strength would be considered specific evidence, or a general
feeling of familiarity; a distinction which has sparked significant debate regarding whether it is
best to consider our memorial system as a single or dual process (see Wixted, 2007; Ratcliff, Van
Zandt & McKoon, 1995). This encompasses the phenomenon regarded in the first of the two
posited questions. The second is indicative of a decision criterion. A decision criterion is a
representation of the necessary memory strength in order to elicit a response.
There is an important distinction between memory strength and decision criterion;
imagine, for example, you are trying to decide if you have previously met a person who is
approaching you. While you watch them coming closer, you consider where you may have seen
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them before. You think you have seen them before, but you can’t remember where. Once they
are close enough for you to greet them, you have to decide whether or how you want to. You
decide to say hello as though you have met them before. It could be that, in this moment, the
evidence in favor of you having met them before reached some threshold, or the pressure of them
approaching diminished the amount of evidence you required to elicit this response, not that the
evidence increased, but instead the amount needed decreased.
While this distinction may seem intuitive, it has proven to be quite difficult to separate
these two concepts experimentally and analytically because they produce the same effect (see
Criss, 2009; Starns, White & Ratcliff, 2012). Response bias is conceptually linked to the decision
criterion, requiring less evidence in favor of one response option over the other. That being said,
and to foreshadow the work in this dissertation, influencing one’s decision criterion may have
implications for the way evidence is evaluated as well. However, stimulus bias can occur either
because of a shift in memory strength, and/or because of a shift in the decision criterion.
More generally, I hope to have demonstrated the importance of considering the relevant
factors that drive a person’s decision to label an item as old (remembered) or new (not). While
the memory literature is rife with examples of such factors, here I focus on the role of decision
biases and how they influence performance in memory tasks. From a theoretical standpoint, we
can look toward developing generative models that establish the forward inference of “these
cognitive factors lead to this pattern of performance”, whereas from an analytical standpoint we
can look toward developing analytical models that establish the reverse inference of “this pattern
of performance indicates these cognitive factors.” For now we focus on the analytical models
and the standard ways in which we infer memorial processes from observed performance in
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memory tasks, with a particular focus on dissociating the stimulus and response biases discussed
above.

Signal Detection Theory
The ways in which researchers think about biases in people’s judgments are constrained
by the theoretical models that we use to characterize data. Take the case of the Signal Detection
Model (SDT; Green & Swets, 1966; Kellen & Klauer, 2015) in which response biases are
conceptualized in terms of the location of a response criterion determining the minimum amount
of evidence required to “accept” test items as targets (e.g., recognize a test item as previously
studied; see Figure 1). Thus, this can be conceptualized as an asymmetry in the minimal amount
of evidence needed to make one decision compared to the minimal amount of evidence needed to
make the other decision. This can be contrasted with a bias implemented on the level of the kinds
of evidence being considered. To reiterate, this is considered a stimulus bias, that one would be
biased to respond to certain features of a stimulus compared to others or compared to a stimulus
that lacks these features. Conceptually, stimulus bias requires the observer to perceive the
stimulus, and thus the features of the stimulus, in order for this bias to influence the decisionmaking process. Whereas response bias does not, instead, response bias is a bias in favor of one
response regardless of any given stimulus information. Importantly, because there is only one
bias mechanism in SDT, the criterion placement, the model framework conflates stimulus and
response bias together.
Figure 1 depicts a representation of SDT in the context of a hypothetical recognition
memory task wherein the decision criterion is manipulated. Typical recognition memory
experiments consist of three stages; a study stage where participants are presented with items,
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often one at a time, and asked to remember them for a future test. Next, a distractor task stage
that is structured to set some predetermined amount of time between when the items are studied
and when they are tested. This stage usually consists of some task that is unrelated to the primary
memory task, for example, being tasked with a set of math problems so that there is minimal
variability in the participants’ effort to rehearse the studied items before being tested. Finally, a
test stage where participants are presented with a set of items, usually one at a time, some of
which they studied, and some they did not and are asked to identify each item as “old” indicating
that they studied it, or “new” indicating it was not part of the study set. The solid line
distribution represents the distribution of memories for all of the studied items. The dashed
distribution represents memory for all unstudied items. This is why the dashed distribution is
shifted further to the left, on an x-axis scale of memory strength indicating weaker memory
overall for items that were not studied compared to items that were. The adoption of the SDT
model enforces an interpretation of experimental manipulations designed to affect response bias.
For instance, informing participants of the test-list composition, let us say 80% of them were
previously studied, is expected to selectively influence the response criterion, such that it
becomes more lenient. This is represented in Figure 1 as a change from the grey vertical line to
the black. These lines both represent decision criteria, where all items contained in either
distribution to the right of the lines elicit an “old” response, and all to the left, a “new” response.
Importantly, memory discriminability is not assumed to change. This is the fundamental
assumption applied in the construction and analysis of Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC)
curves (Green & Swets, 1966; Kellen & Klauer, 2015).
As discussed above, the major limitation of SDT is that it cannot distinguish between
stimulus and response bias, since there is only one mechanism to influence bias. Conceptually
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we can establish that the two types of bias are not the same, yet they are treated equally in SDT.
For example, White and Poldrack (2014) showed that manipulations designed to induce stimulus
or response bias resulted in separable patterns of responses when plotted across the time course
of decisions in the form of a conditional response function (CRF). Fortunately, by introducing
the factor of decision speed (response time) into our behavioral metrics, we can expand the
theoretical framework to one that allows a more nuanced understanding of these two biases.

Figure 1. Representation of Signal Detection Theory Criterion Shift. Solid line distribution and dashed line distribution:
representation of memory strength for studied and unstudied items, respectively. Gray line and black line: representation of
neutral and biased decision criterion, respectively.

Diffusion Model
More comprehensive models account for people’s responses as well as the time taken to
produce them. Take the case of the Diffusion Model (DM; Ratcliff, 1978), a prominent dynamic
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extension of SDT according to which evidence is accumulated across time until it reaches one of
the decision bounds. A representation of the DM is depicted in Figure 2, where the decision
bounds are labeled “A” and “B.” In the case of recognition memory, “A” response could be
indicative of an “old” response and “B” for new. In typical recognition memory experiments,
participants are presented with a list of items, some of which have been studied, and some which
are new items. Thus, in the Figure 2 depiction, the black line extending to the “A” boundary
represents the average evidence accumulation for all responses when, let’s say, studied items are
presented, the black line extending to the “B” boundary for is the same but for unstudied items.
The DM postulates three kinds of biases, two of which are of present interest: On the one hand,
responses can be biased due to changes in the starting point of the evidence-accumulation
process, this is depicted by an asterisk, note its proximity to the “A” response boundary
compared to the “B” response boundary. Responses are deemed biased towards response “A”
rather than “B” when the evidence accumulation-process starts at a position that is closer to the
response “A” boundary than to the “B” boundary. The second kind of bias, known as drift bias,
concerns the way in which information is accumulated (Diederich & Busemeyer, 2006; Ratcliff
& Mckoon, 1981; Townsend & Ashby, 1983). Specifically, evidence is accumulated at a greater
rate for one of the options than for the other. This could be a result of the type of stimuli that are
presented. Imagine a scenario where participants are asked to study a list of items, some of those
items are unrelated to each other, and some are members of a category, let’s say they are the
names of animals. This could result in a shift in drift bias; the evidence accumulation process in
response to the unrelated items might be best represented by the solid black lines, and the
animals by the dashed black lines. This is depicted in Figure 2 by the dashed black lines shifted
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toward the “A” boundary. The third bias is the boundary separation – the distance between the
“A” and “B” boundaries and is hypothesized to reflect response caution.
Although researchers have used the DM in a wide range of domains (for review see
Ratcliff, Smith, Brown, & McKoon, 2017), some researchers have not taken full advantage of
the opportunities that it offers, particularly when it comes to obtaining a more nuanced
characterization of the biases manifested in people’s judgments. For instance, when applying the
DM to recognition-memory judgments, Dube, Starns, Rotello, and Ratcliff (2012) relied on the
same understanding of response bias found in their accompanying SDT analyses, in the sense
that bias was reduced to a ‘starting point’ matter. Although it succeeds in providing a
parsimonious account, there is evidence suggesting that a more fine-grained characterization of
people’s judgments requires both kinds of biases (e.g., Balakrishnan, 1998; Diederich &
Busemeyer, 2006; Starns, Ratcliff, & McKoon, 2012; Van Zandt, 2000).
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Figure 2. Depiction of the Diffusion Model (DM) Representing Drift and Response Bias. Solid and dashed black lines represent
unbiased and biased average drift rates, respectively.

Goals and Overview
The purpose of this work is to provide a better characterization of the dynamics of each
type of bias as they manifest in memorial decisions. I pursue this goal in Part II by re-analyzing
data from experiments meant to induce a response bias. I utilize an analysis technique inspired
by other fields, the coefficient of variation, and to my knowledge never used to analyze data
from simple binary decisions. Then I expand on this analysis by utilizing another related analysis
technique, delta RT plots, primarily utilized in the conflict task literature. In Part III I report
experiments designed to induce a stimulus bias and characterize the dynamics of stimulus bias by
again utilizing an analysis technique from the conflict task literature.
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More specifically, the purpose of this work is to inform the way in which biases influence
simple memorial decisions through understanding how response time distributions change across
bias manipulations. I do this by first introducing an analysis technique called the Difference of
Coefficient of Variation (DCV). This technique provides a simple and easily interpretable
description of the relationship between correct response time distributions. I show how the DM
predictions of the DCV can be compared to DCVs computed from observed data and provide
conclusions regarding the relationship between DM bias parameters that are necessary to account
for the observed data. Next, I utilize an analysis technique from the conflict task literature called
delta RT plot analysis which, I will argue, is a more complex version of the DCV analysis that
allows for the analysis of the relationship between RT distributions across the time course of
those distributions. With this technique, I can infer not only how the relationship between RT
distributions changes between conditions, but also how the relationship changes across the time
course of the distributions. I use the DCV to analyze memorial experiments with response bias
manipulations, then show how these results can be considered via delta RT plots. I also compare
delta plots from manipulations of bias parameters in the DM to delta plots from observed data
and show how that provides novel information. In Part III I analyze experiments with stimulus
bias manipulations using delta RT plots and discuss the conceptual implications of these results
in the context of the standard DM, and how these results support the need for more complex
versions of the DM to account for the observed data.
The overarching conclusions from this work are first, that the DCV analysis shows that
the DM starting point parameter needs to diverge from the drift bias parameter in order to
account for response bias memorial data. An indication regarding how this parameterization may
match the time course of the decision-making process is elucidated via delta RT plot analysis.
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Recognition memory experiments designed to manipulate stimulus bias show a similar effect on
RTs as does response bias, namely with an early influence on the decision-making process which
diminishes for later responses. This pattern of data cannot be accounted for conceptually by the
DM, and thus I do not carry a DM analysis on to the stimulus bias (Part III) portion of this work.
Instead, these results provide evidence in favor of a more complex sequential sampling model
that can both account for the observed data and do so in a way that provides insight through
sensible conceptual mapping of changes in parameter values to differences between experimental
manipulations of bias.

Part II: Response Bias
The first goal of this section of the paper is to investigate the interplay between the DM
account of the two kinds of biases in experiments designed to influence response bias, broadly
defined. As a reminder, response bias refers to a bias in favor of one response option over the
other irrespective of the stimulus presented. Specifically, I will show that different restraints on
DM parameter values yield distinct signature patterns at the level of response times (RTs). In a
reanalysis of previously-published data coming from the recognition memory and visual working
memory literatures (Donkin, Kary, Tahir, & Taylor, 2016; Dube et al., 2012), I show that
response-bias manipulations lead to diverging changes in both kinds of biases. Specifically, by
diverging I mean that starting-point shifts towards the preferred option in tandem with changes in
drift bias towards the non-preferred option. The overarching purpose of this section is to show
that systematic changes in the relevant parameters of the DM (starting point and drift bias)
produce, in some cases, signature patterns of data that can be used to discern between potential
DM derived explanations of response bias.
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Signature Pattern: Difference of Coefficient of Variation (DCV)
The standard approach to fitting the DM to simple biased memorial decision data is to
either constrain certain parameters, and allow those of interest to vary between bias conditions
(e.g., Dube, Starns, Rotello & Ratcliff ,2012; Criss, 2010; White & Poldrack, 2014) or to test
more complex models by constraining certain parameter values contingent on various hypotheses
and manipulations incorporated into the experimental design. For instance, in order to test the
hypothesis that information regarding studied items is more variable than unstudied items (the
unequal variance account) one might constrain parameters in a way that reflects this hypothesis
(e.g., Starns, Ratcliff & Mckoon, 2012). The DM is typically fit to response rates, and some
transformed version of their corresponding RT distributions including median RT (e.g., Dube,
Starns, Rotello & Ratcliff, 2012) or vincentized distributions (e.g., Starns, Ratcliff & McKoon,
2012; Criss, 2010). Then model fits are compared using a fit of distribution statistic, usually
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) or Chi-squared test.
Of course, these model fit indices only measure how well the model prediction matches the
observed data. Understanding why the model and data mismatch depends on more nuanced
comparison of the observed and predicted data. This is typically done by a visual comparison of
the two sets of data.
In the context of the DM, changing the starting point or drift bias parameters in favor of
one response boundary impacts the response rates of both correct responses, and also all other
response RT distributions. This pattern is not diagnosed through AIC, BIC or other measures of
fit. Instead these changes are observed by looking at the predicted data. One of the major
contributions of the technique I propose is that it provides a structure on the data to be analyzed
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in a way that respects how the parameters of the model impact predicted data. Specifically, it
highlights the relative nature of response bias. As response bias in favor of one response means
that the favored response increases and the other response decreases. The analysis technique used
here combines basic descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviation) of both correct response
distributions as a way to represent the relative shape of RT distributions across changes in bias
DM parameters, and this can be compared to the observed data represented in the same way. The
result is straightforward patterns of data which can be easily separated via qualitative visual
assessment (i.e., Navarro, 2019).
We argue that accounting for the relationship between correct response RT distributions
between conditions is crucial to a comprehensive account of the influence of bias in memory.
The justification for this is simple; the decision-making process used in these situations is the
same for all response outcomes. Further, it has been shown that the median RTs for the biased
responses are generally faster than those for the other response and this difference increases as
bias increases (Dube et al., 2012; Starns et al., 2012). As a brief note, I also used “old” and
“new” responses in place of correct responses, resulting in the same interpretation. Researchers
adopting this approach should consider how exactly to structure data in this regard considering
the specific question they are probing. The DM can produce this growing median RT pattern
through changes in either starting point or drift bias. Fortunately, these accounts can be discerned
in as much as they make different predictions regarding the shape of RT distributions. For
example, changes in starting point has a large influence on the shape of the leading edge of the
correct RT distributions whereas changes in drift bias primarily influences the tail end (Ratcliff
& McKoon, 2008). We can capitalize on these predictions by comparing the relative variance,
scaled by respective means, of correct response RT distributions.

17
To do so we rely on the Coefficient of Variation (CV). The CV is a standardized measure
of the variability of a frequency or probability distribution and is defined as the ratio of the
standard deviation to the mean. The CV has been applied in a variety of contexts including
chemistry (Reed, Lynn & Mead, 2002), ecology (Bendel, Higgins, Teberg & Pyke, 1989) and
engineering (Tateno & Glass, 2001). All applications of the CV have an important assumption in
common; the variance of a dataset needs to be understood in the context of the mean. A tractable
example comes from the field of Socioeconomics. When interpreting wealth inequality, some
economists have argued that the metric used needs to be scale independent. The typical assertion
is that if every member of a population were to have their income doubled, this should not
impact the metric of inequality (for review see Kampelmann, 2009). Thus, the CV and other
similar metrics are frequently used to measure income inequality under the assumption that the
variance in wealth should be expected to increase, to some degree, as the mean increases.
I apply the CV to RTs and compute the difference between SD/mean RTs of each type of
correct response (identifying unstudied items as “new” and studied items as old; correct
rejections and hits, respectively), I call this value the Difference of Coefficient of Variation
(DCV). I can then plot the DCVs as a function of the bias manipulation in the case of observed
data or by bias parameter values for data predicted by the DM across bias parameter values as a
way to compare observed data with DM predictions. Said another way, in order to test the claim
that the difference in experimental conditions is due to changes in a bias parameter of the DM, I
can plot the DCV patterns from both the observed data and from the DM in order to see if the
relative pattern of DCVs is the same. Thus, I am not limited by the DM fit to observed data in
any one bias condition. Instead, I am concerned with how RT distributions change relative to
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each other across bias conditions – and how these compare to the DM predictions across
changing bias parameters.
It is generally accepted that variance of a RT distribution increases with the mean and in
some cases, has been shown to be linear (Luce, 1986; Wagenmakers & Brown, 2007). Thus, I
believe this feature of RT distributions along with the fact that both types of correct responses
are a result of the same underlying decision-making process make the DCV an informative
metric when analyzing the influence of bias in simple memorial decisions.
Figure 3 depicts hypothetical correct response RT distributions and their corresponding
DCVs. This figure is meant to showcase the change in DCVs across conditions (e.g., levels of a
response bias manipulation) as they relate to the change in the CVs of the contributing RT
distributions. More specifically, Figure 3 represents possible progressions of the spreading of
paired correct response distributions as response bias increases.
The distributions that represent minimal response bias are represented by the middle two
darkest distributions, one correct response distribution represented by the solid line distribution,
the other a dashed line. These progress out as the colors of the distributions lighten for a total of
three pairs of correct response distributions, each pair spreading further apart from each other as
may happen as the strength of a bias manipulation increases. To maintain this figure as a
representation of response bias correct response distributions, the distributions representing the
responses that the bias is in favor of would in general have smaller mean RTs compared to the
other response and are thus represented by the solid line distributions.
As compared between Figure 3 A & B, there are different ways in which this progression
can happen and can be indicated by the change in DCV. Figure 3 A depicts correct response
distributions where the relative ratio between standard deviation and mean of the distributions
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are the same, and as we will see, this is the pattern produced across changes in only the starting
point parameter alone.
Figure 3 B depicts distributions wherein the standard deviation to mean ratio of the
distribution with the smaller mean RT is higher than that of the other distribution. This is a case
of particular interest here because, as we will see, this pattern is only produced when starting
point and drift bias and systematically changed to diverge from one another in opposite
directions.
I depict RT distributions as normal for the sake of simplicity, but it is important to note
that RT distributions tend to be long tailed like that of an ex-gaussian distribution (Heathcote,
Popiel & Mewhort, 1991). Thus, it is possible that differences in the standard deviation of RT
distributions are indicative at least in part by changes in the tail end of the distribution. For
instance, a long-tailed distribution will increase the mean RT beyond that of the most common
response time, and the long RTs that constitute the tail end of the RT distribution will
particularly impact the variance of the distribution. These longer response times are often
statistical outliers in relation to the entirety of the distribution but can derive from the process of
interest (Van Zandt, 2002). Thus, this becomes a complex issue when estimating the variance of
RT distributions because some portion of extreme RTs are most likely contaminants that should
be excluded from the analysis, and others are not. For example, Leth-Steesen, Elbaz & Douglas
(2000) had typical children and those with ADHD perform a simple decision task. They analyzed
the produced RT distributions via ex-gaussian parameters and found that the RTs produced by
children with ADHD differed from typical children specifically in the size of the long-tailed end
of the distributions. The earlier correct responses were almost identical between groups, making
the difference in the tail end critical to distinguish differences in the underlying decision-making
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process. Thus, simply analyzing mean and variance of the RTs would have resulted in a
misrepresentation of the subtle and informative differences in responding between, in this case,
children with or without ADHD.
Thus, the CV derived from any given RT distribution is not a particularly informative
depiction of the distribution because the relationship between the mean and SD could be
indicative of changes in the body of the distribution, the tail end, or some combination of both.
However, here I am analyzing the difference in CVs (DCV) as a pattern that is produced across
levels of a bias manipulation. While the inability to separate changes in distribution body or tail
still apply to the DCV approach, it allows for an easy to analyze, comprehensive summary of the
relationship between correct response distributions. As we will see, this technique is sufficient to
uncover, with limits, signature patterns that can be used to separate the predictions made by
combinations of starting point and drift bias. This approach allows for agnosticism regarding
what aspect of RT distributions is responsible for their respective standard deviation and instead
addresses how this SD/mean relationship between correct response distributions changes across
bias manipulations and can be used to compare this pattern to the pattern produced by changes in
the bias parameters of the DM. That being said, it is clear that a more detailed analysis of the
shape of RT distributions has its merit. In this context, later I show that the DCV cannot
distinguish between congruent changes in both starting point and drift bias of the DM from
changes only in drift bias. Next, we show that the DM makes specific DCV predictions across
changes in bias parameters.
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Figure 3. Depiction of Linear and Nonlinear DCV. Distributions are paired by greyscale and meant to represent two types of
correct response RT distributions (e.g., Hits and Correct Rejections). Their CVs and paired DCVs are computed.

DM DCV Predictions: Changes in Bias Parameters
Figure 4 depicts the DCVs predicted by the DM across changes in starting point (Fig 4A),
drift bias (Fig 4B), the convergent account, meaning both starting point and drift are changed
systematically in favor of the same response option (Fig 4C), and the divergent account, meaning
starting point and drift bias are systematically changed in favor of opposite response options and
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with starting point changing toward the favored response in line with the bias manipulation (Fig
4D). Importantly, the divergent account is the only one to produce a pattern that is observed in
the empirical data (Fig 4D).
For a frame of reference, let us reconsider how the DM produces predicted data that
matches the structure of two choice memorial data. As a reminder, these tasks consist of two
possible correct responses, correctly identifying a studied item as “old” and correctly identifying
an unstudied item as “new.” Evidence accumulates from the starting point until it reaches one of
the decision boundaries at which time a decision is made. This can be mirrored in the structure of
the DM by allowing for two different evidence accumulators in the form of drift rates; one that
represents evidence accumulation when presented with studied items, and one for unstudied
items. Thus, each drift rate contributes to the production of a distribution meant to represent that
of the correct response RT distribution, and one for the error response distribution.
In order to produce DM predictions, I simulated the DM constraining certain parameters
(see Table 1 for description of parameters) based on the average parameters reported in Starns,
Ratcliff & McKoon (2012). I systematically varied the bias parameters; either starting point
(Figure 4A), drift bias (Figure 4B), or both (Figure 4 C & D). Each set of parameter values was
simulated to produce 30000 trials, and DCV’s were computed from the result of each set of
30000 trials.
While we focused on bias parameters because that is the focus of this dissertation, this
same approach could be valuable for other parameters. Changes in Δ drift as a scale with which
to probe the DCV pattern across changes in bias parameters because Δ drift can be used a
measure of discriminability and is correlated with accuracy manipulations in a variety of
experimental contexts (Ratcliff, Smith, Brown, & McKoon, 2016; Voss et al., 2004). The
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purpose of this is to test whether the general pattern across changes in bias parameters holds true
regardless of Δ drift, and that this is not just an artifact that only holds contingent on
discriminability. Thus, we believe it is important to probe this relationship across Δ drift to
establish a frame of reference regarding what to expect in terms of the DCV pattern considering
one’s ability to discriminate between stimuli in any given experiment where bias is manipulated.
In this regard, it appears that the general patterns remain the same regardless of Δ drift, and that
this primarily impacts the magnitude of the DCV pattern.
Importantly, the parameters used to produce the DM DCV data predicted in Figure 4 are
structured so that the predictions can be logically compared to how the observed DCV data are
presented in Figure 7, which is discussed in greater detail below. To accomplish this, it’s
important to understand how exactly the DCV’s are computed here. DCV’s are the result of CV1
– CV2, CVs are computed as SD/meanRT for one RT distribution. Which RT distribution
contributes to CV1 and CV2 respectively was structured so that it can be compared conceptually
with Figure 7, depicting DCVs of observed data. This was done in Figure 4 by maintaining CV1
as the distribution produced from the drift rate that is set to be more in favor of the response
boundary in line with the response boundary that is favored by the bias parameter in left half of
each figure. For example, in Figure 4A, the x axis depicts the starting point values (z/a) for each
data point. The left most point is .9, the boundaries are quantified as 1 and 0. Thus, this point
indicates a starting point that is particularly close to the 1 boundary. CV1 is therefore computed
from the representation of the correct response distribution for the accumulation that terminates
at this boundary, and CV2 for the 0 boundary. This allows for direct comparison with Figure 7 in
which the CV1 is the correct response option in which the bias manipulation is in favor of for the
left half of the figures. In Figure 4B, starting point is held constant, in this case CV1 is produced
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from the boundary that the drift bias favors in the left half of the figure. This becomes more
complex in the case of Figure 4D where starting point diverges from drift bias. In this case, CV1
is still computed the same as it is in Figure 4A in terms of the relationship between CV1 and
starting point bias.
Thus, a positive DCV value indicates that the value of CV1 is greater than CV2. This
means that relative to their respective means, the distribution used to compute CV1 is more
variable than CV2. Importantly then, if I compare the first left most data point of all Figure 4
panels, we see that the divergent account is the only one that produces a positive value, and the
only to produce a negative value at the right most point. This means that the correct response
distribution favored by starting point placement is only less variable relative to their respective
mean, than the other distribution if drift bias is in favor of the other response option. Thus,
assuming the DM divergent account is an appropriate representation of the decision-making
process when response bias is induced, then response bias results in reducing the amount of
information needed to respond in the direction of the bias manipulation, but also influencing the
processing of information that is present throughout the decision-making process in favor of
information that indicates the other response.
In conclusion, here I have shown that changes in starting point alone don’t change DCV
values, and this is the case across changes in Δ drift as well. Drift bias, and drift bias convergent
with starting point both produce a similar, negative to positive pattern which can be separated
from changes in only starting point, or in the divergent account, but not from each other. Finally,
I show that the only combination that produces a positive to negative pattern is the divergent
account. This is particularly noteworthy, because as we will see, this is the pattern produced by
the observed data depicted in Figure 7. Speaking generally, I have shown that, with limits, this
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analysis technique can be used to discern between disparate accounts of DM bias parameters. It
follows that if the divergent account is the best fitting representation of response bias
manipulations, this account would be reported in published reports of DM fits to applicable
experimental data. Next, I turn to a relevant case where the divergent account is reported.

Table 1. Description of DM Parameters
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Figure 4. Changes in DCV Simulated by Changes in Bias Parameters of the DM. Fixed parameters: Boundary Separation (a) = .09;
Nondecision time (ter) = .4; variability in drift (eta) = .1; variability in starting point (sz) = .05; variability in Nondecision time
(ster) = .15. 30000 trials per condition were simulated. Δ drifts: .1, .2, .3, .4, .5, .6 depicted by greyscale.

Evidence for the Divergent Account in Recognition Memory
To my knowledge, Starns, Ratcliff & McKoon (2012) is the only applicable report of DM
parameters fit to memorial data that depict the divergent account. Amongst other manipulations,
Starns, Ratcliff & McKoon (2012) manipulated response bias via a proportion target
manipulation at test with five conditions ranging from an induction of an “old” to a “new”
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response bias. A representation of the bias parameters published in the original work is depicted
in Figure 5. Figure 5 A depicts both boundary parameters as an alternative parameterization
which is similar to the starting point parameter. Instead of using the standard starting point
parameter, they parameterize both boundaries and each represent how close the boundary is to
the start of the evidence accumulation process for each condition, depicted across the x axis.
Here we can consider the start of the evidence accumulation process to be represented as 0 on the
y axis, and the points of the two lines above it as a representation of the “old” boundary and the
points below as the “new” boundary. Along with the proportion target manipulation, this
experiment included a manipulation designed to encourage participants to respond either quickly
(speed) or accurately (acc) indicated by the solid and dashed lines, respectively. Notice that,
from left to right across Figure 5 A, the start of the evidence accumulation process is closer to
the “new” boundary, and this changes across the panel, as the manipulation moves from a low
proportion of targets (bias in favor of the “new” response), to a high proportion of targets (bias in
favor of the “old” response). This pattern persists in both the speed and accuracy conditions.
Figure 5 B depicts the drift bias (called drift criterion in the original article) parameter across the
proportion target manipulations. As the bias manipulation changes from in favor of the “new” to
“old” response, drift bias shifts from in favor of the “old” response to being in favor of the “new”
response, the opposite direction as compared to that of the relative start of the evidence
accumulation process. However, this is only the case in the accuracy condition, while drift bias
appears to stay roughly consistent across target proportions in the speed condition. Thus, the
summary of the accuracy condition bias parameters across target proportion manipulations
reported by Starns, Ratcliff & McKoon (2012) appears to be that of the divergent account;
starting point (relative boundary placement) is biased toward the boundary indicative of the bias
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manipulation, and drift bias (drift criterion) in favor of the other response. While they published
this account, it was not the focus of their work, and the only relevant mention of this finding in
the paper is stated as, “Thus, the current results are consistent with the picture offered by
previous literature; proportion manipulations always affect boundaries and sometimes affect the
drift criterion as well (pg. 13).”

Figure 5. DM Drift Bias and Starting Point Parameters Republished from Starns, Ratcliff & McKoon, 2012. Figure displays
boundary (A) and drift criterion (B) parameters from DM fit to memorial data across proportion target manipulation (x-axis).
reprinted with permission from Elsevier.

Considering the divergent parameter account, it is reasonable to ask whether the
observed Starns, Ratcliff and McKoon data reflect the positive to negative pattern produced by
the divergent parameter account depicted in Figure 4. It could be that some other combination of
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parameter values not tested in Figure 4 would eliminate the positive to negative pattern that the
present author is unaware of. Fortunately, Starns, Ratcliff & McKoon were kind enough to share
their data and so, to test this, I computed DCV values from the reported parameters. If we
observe the positive to negative DCV pattern in the Starns et al. data, this suggests that the DCV
analysis is a reliable way to probe for this pattern in relation to DM parameter values. Figure 6
depicts these results and shows the positive to negative pattern across target proportions is
evident. This result lends credence to the utility of the DCV data depiction and inspired me to
compute the DCV of other memorial data with a proportion target manipulation. Thus, I
computed the DCV of four other published datasets. I did this in order to test whether
experimental data subjected to a response bias manipulation would produce the positive to
negative DCV pattern and to demonstrate the generalizability of this analysis technique.
Two of the four experiments are long term recognition memory experiments where
participants completed multiple study-test blocks. At test, participants were subjected to different
proportions of studied and unstudied items and were informed regarding this proportion after
studying and before the test phase began, this is the response bias manipulation. The other two
experiments are visual working memory experiments. In these experiments, participants are
shown an array consisting of 2, 4,6, or 8 colored squares and are then shown one of the colored
squares in either the same position it was in previously (same trial) or in a different position
(change trial). The proportion of same trials was varied, and participants were informed of this
ratio before the start of every test block (for more details see Table 2, and the original articles).
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Figure 6. Computed DCV from data published in Starns, Ratcliff & McKoon, 2012. DCVs computed for each target proportion
condition (x-axis).

In Figure 7 we show the same positive to negative DCV pattern across four different
experiments with proportion target manipulations. I chose to re-analyze data derived from
recognition memory and visual working memory experiments for a few reasons. First, so that I
could test whether the to-be-discussed data pattern is more likely to be a result of the
manipulation used to induce response bias, or is specific to certain aspects of memory, for
example, recognition memory vs. visual working memory. To preview the results, the data
pattern turns out to be the same for all re-analyzed experiments, indicating that the results
depicted here are more likely to be indicative of a phenomenon resulting from a manipulation of
response bias than it is a result of differences in the type of memory tasked in either of these
experiments.
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I found a positive to negative DCV pattern across conditions in all four experiments. I
confirmed this pattern by computing Bayes Factors to test the hypothesis that the slopes are 0
against the alternative that slopes are nonzero. This was done using the Jeffery-Zellner-Siow
prior with an assumed effect size scaling of r = 1, as recommended by Rouder et al. (2009,
http://pcl.missouri.edu/bf-one-sample). The Bayes factor BF10 can be interpreted as the ratio of
evidence for the alternative H1 (slopes are different from 0) to the evidence in favor of the null
hypothesis H0 (slopes are not different from 0). For example, Bayes Factor BF10 = 10 may be
thought of as stating that it is 10 times more likely that this data came from a distribution
centered around H1 than H0. I map Bayes Factors to a verbal account for or against H1 using the
modified classification scheme of Jeffreys (1961) as described by Wetzels et al. (2011). I found
strong evidence that slopes computed for all four reanalyzed experiments are negative (BF10=
223.5, 2321, 93, 3 for recognition memory exp 1, 2, VWM 1,2, respectively).
This is strong evidence across four different experiments of the positive to negative
pattern produced by manipulating response bias in the context of recognition and visual working
memory. This means that the distribution representing the correct response that is favored by the
response bias manipulation is relatively more variable compared to its mean as compared to the
other correct response distribution. In terms of the DM bias parameters, this pattern is only
produced when starting point is placed in favor of the manipulation and drift bias is in
opposition, named the divergent account. Conceptually, this implies that manipulating response
bias by informing participants about the proportion of studied items that will be presented at test,
not only influences the amount of information they require to make a decision (starting point) it
also influences how they process the information that they are presented (drift bias), I discuss
this in greater detail in the discussion section.
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Table 2. Details of Reanalyzed Experiments. The proportion manipulation refers to the proportion of “old” (recognition memory)
or “same” (visual working memory) items presented at test. Please see original publications for more details.

Experiments
Recognition Memory 1
Recognition Memory 2
Visual Working Memory 1
Visual Working Memory 2

Proportion
Participants Manipulation
29
.75, .66, .5, .33, .25
26
.75, .66, .5, .33, .25
33
.86, .7, .5, .3, .14
15
.86, .7, .5, .3, .14

Blocks
20
20
10
10

Test Trials
24
24
60
60
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Figure 7. DCVs computed from data Published in Dube, Starns, Rotello & Ratcliff (2012) & Donkin, Kary, Yahir & Taylor (2016).
DCVs computed across conditions (x-axis). Error bars depict standard error.

Does the DM Produce the Divergent Account?
It stands to reason that if the aforementioned divergent parameter DM account of
response bias produces the DCV data pattern, then fitting the DM to these data should mirror
these parameter values. To test this, I chose the largest sample of the four re-analyzed
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experiments (see Table 2, Visual Working Memory Experiment 1) and fit the DM using the
open-source R-based package Dynamic Models of Choice (DMC) (Heathcote et al., 2018). The
VWM experiments reanalyzed here were not used to fit the DM previously as this was not the
aim of the original paper. The two recognition memory experiments discussed here had been
used to fit the DM but only used median RTs because of the small trial number of these
experiments. Thus, I concluded that these datasets were not of sufficient size for this purpose.
The DMC is implemented such that the estimate of the posterior distribution of DM parameters
for each subject at the individual and at the group level can be obtained simultaneously using
differential evolution and Markov Chain Monte Carlo sampling with Metropolis-Hastings DEMCMC (Ter Braak, C.J.F, 2006; Turner, Sederberg, Brown & Steyvers, 2013). Imposing this
hierarchical structure between participant and group level parameters allows for individual
participant parameter values to be informed by the values of other participants and thus allows
for small data sets to be fit whereas that was not previously possible.
When fitting the DM, there are a variety of decisions that can be made regarding which
parameters of the DM to include, and which to constrain between participants and between
conditions. Thus, I fit the DM to this dataset multiple times, each with different restrictions and
in every case the qualitative result is the same. In order to allow for a measure of drift bias, one
consistent restriction between all iterations was to fix Δ drift so that a pure measure of drift bias
could be obtained. The overarching conclusion for this exercise was that, regardless of the
specifics of each fit, a convergent parameter account was obtained. This means that across
conditions, the starting point and drift bias parameters both changed in the same direction. A
representative example of these parameters is depicted in Figure 8. Figure 8 depicts the starting
point and drift bias parameter values for each of the conditions (x-axis). The values on the x-axis
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depict the proportion of “same” trials, increasing from .14 to .86 across conditions. Here we see
drift bias (dashed line) and starting point (solid line) moving from relatively low to high across
condition .14 to .86 proportion same trials considered the convergent account.

Figure 8. Starting Point and Drift Bias Parameter Results to VWM Experiment 1. Black line depicts starting point across
conditions. Grey dashed line depicts drift bias across conditions. Error bars depict standard error

In order to better gauge the DM fit to the data, I plotted the probability of a response, by
response, for each condition comparing these probabilities between the model predicted data and
the observed data in Figure 9. While overall, it appears that the model provides an adequate fit to
the data, I want to draw attention to where the model performs the worst, these panels are bolded.
First, to orient one to the figure, each panel depicts one response option (first column is “same”
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response, second is “change” response) in one condition separated by rows. The thicker lines
depict the observed data, with the solid one being correct responses, and dashed being incorrect
responses. The thinner lines are the same but depict the data predicted from the DM fit. Notice
that the highlighted panels, the ones that depict the worst fit are those that represent the response
option opposed to the bias manipulation. For example, the first two rows, the highlighted panels
depict the “same” response and these conditions have relatively few correct “same” trials, and
vice versa in the last two rows. Qualitatively, it appears that the misfits in these panels are
similar; these responses are too few, and too slow. Remember that, relative to the other
conditions, the drift bias parameters are placed away from the direction of these response
options. While this is certainly an oversimplification, this could indicate that drift bias toward
these response options may alleviate this misfit. That being said, this change would also have to
be fine-tuned in the context of the other parameters, particularly but not exclusively, starting
point. Overall, the simulation did not produce the divergent account of parameter values that I
anticipated based on the DCV analysis of the data, possible explanations for that will be
discussed in greater detail in the discussion section.
Notably, Figure 9 depicts the DM fit in terms of probability of a response across RT. As a
reminder, the DCV only incorporates RTs, not response rates. It appears as though the identified
misfits depicted in Figure 9 appear primarily in the extreme bias manipulation conditions, and
the misfit, while minor overall, appear to grow as the RTs increase. This highlights a limitation
with the DCV analysis in that we cannot compare how well the relationship between correct
response RT distributions is fit by the DM across the RT distributions. Said another way, does
the DM account of the relationship between correct response RT distributions change for later
responses compared to earlier ones? One way to address this question is to analyze the
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relationship between correct RT distributions across respective portions of the distributions, the
plots of this information are called delta plots.
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Figure 9. HDDM Predicted and Observed Data (VWM Exp1) Probability of Response Across Time. Columns 1 & 2 depict response
to “same” and “change” stimuli, respectively. Thick and thin lines represent observed and predicted data, respectively. Solid and
dashed lines represents ”same” and ”change” responses, respectively. Y-axis depicts the probability of response and x axis
depicts response time. Black box meant to highlight panels of interest because of relative DM misfit.
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Delta RT plots and their Relation to DCVs
One limitation of the DCV analysis is that it is a global measure whereas cognitive
processes and their RT distributions are likely dynamic and change across time. In terms of the
DM, the DCV is not able to separate the drift bias account from the drift bias and starting point
account (refer back to Figure 4). To resolve both of these concerns, I introduce an analysis
technique that provides a higher level of resolution regarding the relative shape of the correct
response RT distributions. I propose that delta plots supply the necessary resolution to separate
these two potential accounts. But more importantly than separating starting point from drift bias,
is to be able to assess, beyond the structure of the DM, how the response bias influences earlier
decisions compared to later ones.
As discussed above, the DCV provides information regarding the variance and mean of
correct response distributions relative to each other. However, it does not provide resolution
regarding the relative shape of these distributions. For example, and as discussed previously, the
DCV does not provide information regarding whether differences in the variance/mean
relationship between distributions is indicative of the body, tail or both of the distributions. Said
another way, the difference in the earlier portion of the distributions might not be the same as the
difference between the later portions of the distributions but this is hard to see by looking at a
full distribution. Delta plots highlight these types of differences and can separate the relationship
between response distributions as they unfold across response time. I make the case that delta RT
plots can be utilized in order to better understand how response bias and stimulus bias influence
the decision-making process in recognition memory tasks.
Delta RT plots are produced by binning two RT distributions and computing the
difference in RT between relative portions of each distribution. Delta RT plots have been
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primarily utilized in the conflict task literature (see Pratte, Rouder, Morey & Feng, 2010). As I
will argue, there is an analogous relationship between conflict tasks and bias manipulations in
memorial tasks. To preview the following section, delta RT plots have been reported elsewhere
and are reported here that depict a differential relationship between RT distributions which
changes contingent on the portion of the distribution that is being compared. Fortunately, the
conflict task literature has expanded on connecting the complex relationship between RT
distributions to underlying conceptual interpretation. Here I primarily leverage this insight to
understand the case of bias in recognition memory tasks. Thus, what follows is a justification for
the utilization of delta RT plots to inform on the influence of bias on the decision-making
process in recognition memory tasks both using response bias manipulations, and in Part III,
semantic similarity (Experiment 1) and image feature similarity (Experiment 2).
In conflict tasks, one aspect of the stimulus-response pairing conflicts with another. For
instance, in the Simon task, a stimulus might be presented on the left side of the screen, which
primes the left-hand response, but the stimulus itself is mapped to the opposite (right hand)
response. Thus, the location conflicts with the stimulus information, and this incongruency leads
to slower and less accurate responses. The overarching purpose of conflict tasks is to probe the
ways in which the irrelevant stimuli impact the decision-making process.
Delta RT plots display the difference between RTs of correct responses for congruent and
incongruent trials at each RT bin. In a typical conflict task, RTs are longer for correct
incongruent responses compared to congruent responses and this effect diminishes with
additional processing of the stimulus. In terms of recognition memory, I plot the difference in
mean RT between correct responses for targets (hits) and foils (correct rejections) in each bin.
Delta RT plots can inform on the time course of evidence that, for example, influences decision
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making in a way that makes hits faster, and correct rejections slower and can indicate when and
if this influence diminishes throughout the decision-making process.
To create delta RT plots, I use vincentized quantiles, which means that responses for
applicable trials for each participant are binned into the fastest 10,30,50,70 and 90% of
responses. I take the difference in RT in each bin between correct rejections and hits and plot it
over the mean RT in each bin. For example, a delta plot data point with a y-axis value of 50 ms
means that the correct rejection RT distribution is 50 ms greater than the hit distribution at a
respective portion of each distribution, indicated by the data points placement on the x axis.
Thus, it is important to consider consecutive delta plot points across the x axis in the context of
the previous points.
To illustrate this concept, imagine two cars driving down a road, one car is going 30
mph, the other is going 50 mph and their respective speeds never change. After these cars drive
for 15 seconds, we measure the distance between the cars, then again at 30, 45 and 60 seconds.
The distance between the cars would grow across time, when we plot our four data points with
the four samples across the x axis and the difference at each point on the y axis, the line would
be linear and positive (or negative depending on how the difference is computed). Imagine,
instead the line is positive and then flattens out, or starts as a positive slope and then a negative
slope for the later segment. This would be evidence that, as some point, one or both of the cars
changed speed and we could say one of the cars would had to have slowed down, or the other
sped up, or both. Now we can consider the consistency of the speed of the cars as the consistency
of the evidence accumulation process, and deviation from a linearly increasing line as evidence
that the rate of the evidence accumulation process has changed in some way throughout the
decision-making process.
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This car analogy breaks down in an important way which highlights how useful the delta
plot analysis technique really is in this context. This is because the factors that control the speed
of one car are separate from the factors that control the speed of the other. Because of this, we
would want to instead ask which car slowed down, or sped up, not to bypass this more direct
assessment by measuring the gap between them across time. This is not the case for correct
response time distributions in the present context. Instead, the process or processes that produce
one correct RT distribution are also responsible for the production of the other one. Thus, asking
which RT distribution “slowed down” or “sped up” is not a sensible question, and instead we
take the difference between them at respective segments as an indication of the process/s that
produced them.
Figure 10 depicts hypothetical RT distributions (first column), the quantile plots (second
column) and delta RT plots (third column) of the corresponding distributions. We can see the
delta plots produced by a variety of relationships between RT distributions. The first three
columns depict changes in the mean and variance of the distributions that produce linear delta
RT plots. Panel A produces a flat delta plot as a result of one distribution with a greater mean RT
but the same variability as the other distribution. The same variability between these distributions
is the reason the line is flat, shifting the mean while maintaining the variability shifts the line up
300 ms on the y axis as the mean of one distribution is 300 ms greater than the other. Panel C
depicts a negative going delta RT plot as a result of the distribution with the greater mean RT
being less variable than the other distribution. This should be considered a more extreme version
of the delta RT plot presented in Panel A in the sense that both of these delta plots are produced
when the distribution with the greater mean RT is not more variable than the other distribution;
analogous to the DCV pattern produced by the divergent account discussed above. Panel B

43
depicts a positive going delta RT plot, produced when the distribution with the greater mean RT
is more variable than the other distribution. If the variability of the distribution with the greater
mean RT increases linearly with the mean RT as compared to the other distribution, this pattern
would map onto the DCV produced by changes in starting point. If the difference in variability
between the distributions exceeds that of the mean RTs, this would map onto the DCV produced
by changes in drift bias and/or the convergent account (drift bias and starting point).
Panel D and E depict more complex hypothetical RT distributions and the corresponding
delta RT plots. The complexity comes from the non-normal (right skewed and left skewed,
respectively) hypothetical RT distributions, these are included here for a few reasons. First, as
discussed previously RT distributions tend to be non-normal and long tailed. Second, and most
importantly, this is the heart of the additional interpretation that can be gained from delta RT
plots beyond what is offered by the DCV analysis. Finally, some of the delta RT plots reported
here and in the majority of research cited here are often non-linear. I include the Panel D and E
delta RT plots in particular, to show that changing the skew of one distribution results in the nonlinear delta RT plot. Critically, it is important to remember that the delta RT plots are indicative
of the difference between the same relative binned regions of the RT distributions. Thus, a
greater difference in the RTs of the tail end of the distributions, as depicted in Panel D and E,
only mean that the skew of one distribution is greater than the other, not that one of the
distributions is particularly skewed, as the depiction may imply.
This point gets to the heart of the strategy behind the analysis techniques used in this
dissertation. That is to consider the relationship between correct response distributions instead of
considering either distribution independently. Thus, to say, for instance, that the “old” response
RT distribution is noteworthy in some way excludes the fact that the same decision-making
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process sometimes results in “new” responses. This is exactly what is gained by the DCV, and to
a higher level of resolution, with delta RT plots. However, we lose any information regarding the
shape of either distribution independently. This, I argue, is not only an acceptable loss, but is a
more informative depiction of the RT distributions because it represents a combination of both
possible responses (e.g., “old” or “new”) together instead of treating them as separate entities.
Thus, staying true to the fact that the overall decision-making process is what is of interest and
that this decision-making process is responsible for all responses.
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Figure 10. Depiction of RT Distributions, Corresponding Quantile RT Plots and Delta RT Plots. Hypothetical RT distributions
(column 1) were produced by simulating data from ex-gaussian parameters. This data was then binned into .1 ,.3, .5 ,.7, .9
responses (column 2). The difference between the binned data was calculating and plotted (column 3) as a representation of
Delta RT plots.
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For a frame of reference, I turn next to delta RT plots produced from the same changes in
parameter values as displayed in the depiction of the DCV in figure 4 and compare the delta RT
plots to the DCVs produced by the same DM parameter values. Figure 4 depicts the DCVs
produced by systematic changes in bias parameters (starting point and drift bias) either alone or
together in the same (convergent) or different (divergent) directions. Figure 11 depicts these
same parameter values but in the form of delta plots instead of DCVs. In order to represent in
general how delta plots change contingent on changes in starting point and drift bias, I chose to
depict the delta plots produced from the same parameters used to depict the DCVs in Figure 4.
Figure 11 depicts the delta plots from the parameters that produced the .3 Δ drift in each panel.
To better understand the relationship between DCV and delta RT plots, consider the
DCVs and delta RT plots produced through changes in the starting point parameter (Figure 4A &
11A). The DCVs remain around 0 across changes in starting point and produce linear delta RT
plots. This is because a DCV of 0 corresponds to a linear delta RT plot, with an important
exception. This exception is exemplified in row 1 of Figure 10. This delta RT plot is technically
linear but does not correspond to a DCV of 0. One way to think about this is to consider a
theoretical expansion of the plotted delta RT that includes an initial point with a 0 x and y axis
value. If this value is included, then this delta RT plot is not linear, it increases then flattens out.
To reinstate the racing cars analogy, imagine that the first time you measure the distance
between the cars, one car is ahead of the other, but this distance remains constant for all other
data points taken as the cars race. The conclusion here would be that, somehow, one of the cars
was moving faster than the other, but once data was being collected, this force had subsided or
was also taken on by the other car. To bring this analogy into the world of simple decisionmaking, this is evidence that there was some influence on the decision-making process that
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influenced the earliest of decisions and had been diminished or suppressed. However, the linear
delta RT plots depicted in Figure 11A would remain linear with the inclusion of an initial 0,0
point and can therefore also be represented with a DCV of 0. In terms of the conceptual nature of
starting point, this means that it continues to exert influence consistently throughout the decisionmaking process. Intuitively, it may seem sensible to predict that a change in starting point would
produce a delta RT plot like that depicted in Figure 10A because of the conceptual nature of the
starting point parameter in the sense that it indicates an a priori bias in favor of one direction, and
in terms of the DM, begins the evidence accumulation process closer to one boundary compared
to the other.
To provide clarity in this regard, we can once again consider the race car analogy.
Instead, to improve the analogy, imagine the race has five check points, and we are not
measuring the distance between the cars, instead we are comparing the difference in how long it
took each car to reach their five respective check points. Let’s say, with an unbiased starting
point, each check point is 5, 10, 15, 20 and 25 miles away from the beginning of the race. A
change in starting point should be considered as the same conversion to all checkpoints for one
car, and an equal and opposite change between cars. Therefore, a change in starting point could,
for instance, decrease the distance between it and all of its checkpoints by half, and thus
increasing the distance between the other car and its checkpoints by 1.5. Now one car would
have checkpoints at 2.5, 5, 7.5, 10 and 12.5 miles, and the other car at 7.5, 15, 22.5, 30, 37.5
miles. In terms of a DCV of these points, for the first set, we get a standard deviation of 3.95 a
mean of 7.5 and a CV of .527. For the second set we get a standard deviation of 11.86, a mean of
22.5 and, of course a CV of .527 resulting in a DCV of 0. In terms of delta RTs, we take the
difference between these distances to checkpoints, we get 5, 10, 15, 20, 25 mile difference, a
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linear plot with a positive slope, like the ones we see in the delta RT plots across changes in
starting point.
Next, consider changes in drift bias in terms of DCVs (Figure 4 B) and delta RT plots
(Figure 11 B). Changes in drift bias produce negative or positive DCVs, depending on which
response boundary is being favored by the drift bias. A non-zero DCV means that one CVs
SD/mean ratio is larger than the other and thus, the variability of one distribution is larger
relative to its mean, than the other. The delta RT plots expand our understanding of this
relationship by showing that the distance between the RT distributions increases for each
respective segment of the RT distributions, and that the amount in which it increases is greater
for each consecutive segment. This is represented in the delta RT plot by the y axis values
between quantiles 2 and 3 being larger than the gap between 1 and 2, and 3 and 4 being larger
than 1 and 2, 2 and 3, and so on. In terms of the race car analogy, drift bias could be considered
analogous to the rate in which the race cars are accelerating, and thus, while the rate of
acceleration remains consistent within each car, the difference in the speed that the cars are going
by the end of the race is far greater than it is at the beginning of the race resulting in larger and
larger differences in the time it takes for each car to reach their respective checkpoints.
The convergent account (Figure 11 C) is simply a combination of the two previously
discussed accounts, although it is worth mentioning that the DCV pattern between the drift bias
and convergent account is the same, but with a diminished magnitude. This is because the nonzero DCVs are produced through changes in drift bias and the magnitude of drift bias is
diminished in the convergent account compared to the drift bias account so that the response
rates produced by these two accounts are comparable. In terms of the delta RT plots, we can see
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that it is changes in drift bias that produces nonlinear delta RT plots, but this nonlinearity in the
convergent account is less extreme as compared to the drift bias account.
Finally, consider the DCVs produced by the divergent account (Figure 4 D) and the
corresponding delta RT plots (Figure 11 D). The DCV depicts a positive to negative pattern, this
makes sense because the response boundary favored by drift bias across the figure is in the
opposite direction as compared to the drift bias and convergent accounts, thus producing the
opposite DCV pattern. In terms of delta RT plots, we see that the slopes of the delta RT plots
produced by the divergent account are less extreme as compared to those produced by starting
point alone (Figure 11 A). This difference is caused by the opposition of drift bias, diminishing
the slope of the delta RT plots. In fact, we can see this clearly in the last segment of the divergent
delta RT plots as the slope actually changes direction. On the whole, as depicted by the DCVs,
this results in a relatively less variable distribution respective to its mean for the distribution with
the larger mean RT. The delta RT plots add to this interpretation in that we see the influence of
starting point and drift bias oppose each other throughout the course of the hypothetical decisionmaking process. With the influence of the opposing drift bias becoming clear at the tail end of
the delta RT plots. This highlights an issue in terms of bridging the gap between what we know
about the DM parameters value which produced the divergent account delta RT plots, and how
we should interpret observed data which appear to require this sort of parameterization.
As an example of how to interpret delta RT plots, I turn next to insight provided by the
conflict task literature which has informed on the conceptual interpretation mapped onto the
shape of different delta RT plots.
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Figure 11. Depiction of DM Predicted Delta RT Plots Across Changes in Bias Parameters. Delta RT plots were computed based on
the parameters presented in figure 4 (.3 Δ drift).

Delta RT Plots and Conflict Tasks
One popular way to probe simple decision-making is to design an experiment in
which participants must suppress or ignore irrelevant information that conflicts with information
indicative of the correct response. There are three commonly used experimental tasks: Stroop,
Flanker, and Simon tasks. The results of these tasks show that the suppression of conflicting
evidence is only partially successful. Further, suppression of the conflicting evidence takes time
and cognitive effort, and therefore alters the rate that evidence is accumulating throughout the
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decision-making process. These tasks produce faster errors than correct responses for
incongruent trials only, a pattern of data that cannot be modeled with a constant drift rate (White
et al., 2011). This complex pattern of data has inspired a new class of models in order to account
for data produced by these conflict tasks.
The first of these tasks, named the Stroop task (Stroop, 1935), induces response
conflict by asking participants to name the color of a written word. The written word is always
the name of a color; this name may or may not be the name of the color of the text. This allows
for conflicting or supporting evidence depending on whether or not there is congruency between
the color and the written word. Another task of response conflict is the Simon task (Simon,
1969). The Simon task produces a situation where spatial task-irrelevant information conflicts
with some other, non-spatial task relevant information (e.g., color, tone, form). For example, this
task may ask the participant to press a key on the right side if a stimulus is blue, and a key on the
left side if the stimulus is red. This stimulus will be presented on either the right or left side, this
presentation will sometimes conflict with the side of the button indicating the appropriate
response, leading to response conflict in some trials. The final task to be discussed here is the
Flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974). In the Flanker task, participants are asked to respond to
a target that is flanked with either congruent or incongruent stimuli. For example, the target
stimulus could be an arrow pointing left or right and the participant would have to press a
corresponding key to indicate the correct answer. Arrows may flank this target stimulus that are
either pointing in the same (congruent), or different (incongruent) direction as the target
stimulus, resulting in the presentation of corresponding or conflicting information, respectively.
At a broad level, the data from these conflict tasks reveal the same trend; responses
are faster for congruent trials compared to incongruent trials, this is called the congruency effect.
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However, distinct patterns become apparent in the fine-grained analysis of the distributions from
each of these tasks via delta RT plots. This way, researchers can observe the strength of the
congruency effect for a wide range of RTs and compare these patterns to the same analyses done
on other conflict tasks. This has revealed differences between the conflict tasks discussed earlier.
For example, the congruency effect seems to grow as RTs increase in the Stroop task (Pratte et
al., 2010; Spieler, Balota & Faust, 1996), and decrease in the Simon task (Burle, van den
Wildenberg & Ridderinkhof, 2005; Pratte et al., 2010). These results seem to suggest two
conclusions. First, the type of information that is attended to changes throughout the decisionmaking process. Second, the way in which this information changes are in some way different
between these tasks.
Ridderinkhof, Scheres, Oosterlaan & Sergeant (2005) had participants with and
without ADHD complete the flanker task and analyzed the data in using delta RT plots. They
showed that participants with ADHD tended to produce positively going delta RT plots like that
depicted in row 2 of Figure 10 and of the top half of the starting point, drift bias and convergent
delta RT plots depicted in Figure 11 A, B & C. In the context of the flanker task, this means that
the difference between incongruent and congruent trial response times increases across the
segments of the respective distributions. Conceptually, this is interpreted as evidence that the
participants with ADHD are influenced by the irrelevant incongruent flankers and this influence
is exerted even for later decisions. Thus, these participants are unable or partially unable to
suppress the influence of the flankers and presumable have difficulty focusing their attention on
only the relevant stimulus. The control participants produce delta RT plots that are positive and
grow across the first two quantiles, but the positive growth stops around the point of the 2nd
quantile. This is interpreted as a representation of the control participants’ initially being
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influenced by the irrelevant incongruent flankers, but that this influence is suppressed for later
decisions. Thus, these participants seem to be able to, across time, focus their attention away
from the irrelevant flankers, and onto the relevant stimulus as compared to the participants with
ADHD.
In terms of the delta RT plots produced by only changing starting point or drift bias,
we see that starting point appears to have more of an influence on earlier decisions, and the
opposite is true for drift bias (see also White & Poldrack, 2014; Ridderinkhof, 2002). With this
in mind, next I turn to delta RT plots from the aforementioned VWM experiment fit the DM
plotting both delta RTs from the observed data and data predicted by the fit DM parameters. The
purpose of which is threefold; First, to contrast the observed delta RT plots with their respective
DCVs, second, to contrast the DM fit to the observed data in terms of the delta RTs and finally to
provide insight into whether the divergent account is actually a comprehensive account of the
data.

Response Bias Delta Plots: Observed and DM Predicted
Figure 12 depicts the delta RT plots from the VWM Experiment 1 with only the most
extreme bias manipulation conditions depicted along with delta plots predicted from the DM
parameters used from the aforementioned DM fit to the observed data. The observed data is
depicted with dashed lines, DM predicted data with solid lines. The triangle points indicate the
.86 condition (bias in favor of the “same” response) and the circles depict data from the .14
condition (bias in favor of the “change” response). Here we see clear misses, and to some degree,
in the opposite direction at the extreme ends of the bias manipulation conditions. The DM
predicted delta plots show a positive or negative slope, indicating that the gap between correct
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response distributions increases across respective portions of the RT distributions. At this point,
it should be of no surprise that the convergent parameter account produced by the DM fit (Figure
8) produces this pattern of data. Thus, this is taken as more evidence that the standard DM
account of response bias is an inadequate account of the observed data. Once again, the DM
predicted delta plots are also reminiscent of the DCV patterns produced by the drift bias or
convergent account in that both of these Delta RT plot patterns show that the RT distribution
with the larger mean RT is relatively more variable than the other distribution and that this
difference between respective segments of the RT distributions grows across consecutive
segments.
In terms of the DCVs, we know that the divergent account would be a better fit to the
data. However, in terms of the delta RT plots produced by the divergent account as compared to
the observed delta RTs, it is less clear whether these accounts would be sufficient. I leave open
the possibility that some reasonable combination of starting point and divergent drift bias would
produce delta RT plots close to the flat lines at different intercepts seen in the observed delta
RTs, however, I was unable to produce this pattern. Of course, not only would this delta RT
pattern need to be produced, but it would also need to be accompanied by a reasonable response
rates close to those of the observed data.
A better approach to this might be to attribute the conceptual interpretation from the
aforementioned conflict task literature in the context of response bias in recognition memory.
The observed delta RTs are both flat lines at different intercepts, this pattern is represented in
Figure 10A, indicating a shift in the mean of one distribution but with both distributions being
equally variable. Unsurprisingly, the delta RTs also show that the correct response RT
distribution in favor of the bias manipulation has a smaller mean RT compared to the other
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distribution. This could be interpreted as a very early influence that is suppressed for all later
decisions. On its surface, this may seem similar to the concept of starting point, but it is different.
To reinstate the racing car analogy, I said that a change in starting point is to reduce the distance
between a car and all of its checkpoints. A better analogy to attribute in the case of these
observed delta plots is as if one car gets held back for a few seconds while the other moves
ahead, and then the held back car gets released, and the two cars proceed at the same speed for
the rest of the race.
The only parameter with this quality is nondecision time (Ter). Conceptually, Ter is
associated with the aspects of one’s response other than the decision-making process. This
includes the time it takes to orient oneself to the stimuli, and to accomplish a physical response.
Thus, for this parameter to account for the difference between correct old and new responses, I
would have to conclude that the presentation of either old or new items somehow impacts one’s
ability to orient to the stimuli or engage in a motor response. This is why it would be against the
existing theoretical interpretations of the DM to allow Ter to vary contingent on type of stimulus
presented. Because of this, I do not pursue this account any further as it is the view of the author
that any interpretation based on within condition differences in Ter do not add any conceptual
value.
Next, I discuss the implications of these results both in terms of the DM and provide
alternative conceptual interpretations of response bias in simple memorial decisions.
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Figure 12. Delta RT Plot of VWM 1 Observed and DM Predicted Data. The top and bottom lines represent the DM predicted and
observed (solid and dashed lines, respectively) of the .14 and .86 “same” trial proportion conditions. Error bars depict standard
error

Discussion
Our results highlight the relationship between correct response RT distributions when
bias is manipulated in memory. Our findings boil down to the response with the larger mean RT,
produced by inducing bias in favor of the other response, is not more variable than the other
correct response RT distribution, which is counter to what is typically observed in RT tasks (see
Wagenmakers & Brown, 2007). Further, I show that this relationship is systematic across
different levels of bias and is seen in both recognition and visual working memory experiments. I
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also show that neither DM implementation of bias is sufficient, in solitude, to produce the
observed pattern of data. However, the proper pattern of data is produced when starting point and
drift bias are constrained toward opposing boundaries, considered the divergent account. That is,
when the starting point shifts towards the biased response, but the drift criterion shifts toward the
other response. That being said, when interpreting the data in the form of a delta RT plot, we see
that even the divergent account may not provide an adequate interpretation of the underlying
decision-making process when manipulating response bias in simple memorial decisions.
Instead, it might be that a conceptual interpretation from the conflict task literature and reframed
in the present context can provide insight into how a response bias manipulation influences the
decision-making process. What follows is a discussion of these results in the context of the
implementation of the DM, and a in terms of the general conceptual implications of these
findings.
Wagenmakers & Brown (2007) showed that mean RT and variance tended to be linearly
related. They came to this conclusion by reanalyzing data from a variety of simple decision
experiments that included an accuracy manipulation. The present work depicts a case where this
linearity is violated. Thus, any account of these tasks that makes predictions regarding RT
distributions needs to produce distributions with the smaller mean RT being relatively more
variable than the distribution with the larger mean RT, and this relationship between distributions
should persist across conditions. It is clear that simple decision tasks tend to produce this linear
relationship, and that the DM does well accounting for data with this mean and variance
relationship across conditions. However, here we are probing a slightly less simple situation by
introducing bias and potentially conflict, resulting in the violation of linearity, and an arguably
insufficient account provided by the DM. This opens the door for analysis techniques like the
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DCV and delta plots to provide insight into the influence bias manipulations have over the
decision-making process.
We see when fitting the DM to data with this violation of linearity, it nonetheless
produces the convergent account. This could be because the standard misfit penalty used in the
fitting procedure was not customized to prioritize the misfit in a way that I think is important.
Considering the goal is to understand bias, then a better option might be to customize the misfit
to penalize specifically missing the sort of pattern of data represented by the DCV across
conditions.
The DM parameterization that can account for this DCV pattern is one where starting
point is placed in favor of the response option in line with the bias manipulation and drift bias in
favor of the other response option. This parameterization appears to imply a compensatory
mechanism as an account of bias. Expecting disproportionate stimulus types prompt a priori bias
(starting point bias), but also results in overweighting the evidence in favor of the opposing
response (drift bias). This may seem counterintuitive, but if it is not surprising that prior
expectations influence how evidence is interpreted then it should follow that this relationship is
systematic; you weight evidence, in part, contingent on the strength of your prior expectations.
Said another way, if you believe you will encounter a certain type of stimuli, you may
overweight evidence that disconfirms your a priori belief. Imagine you work for a strawberry
supplier and your job is to ensure the quality of the strawberries that pass along the conveyor
belt. Your a priori belief is that the vast majority of strawberries passing through are of sufficient
quality. Thus, you seek out evidence to the contrary (e.g., green strawberries, unusual shapes,
signs of fungus etc.) and if no evidence to the contrary is found, you resort to your initial
assumption, metaphorically allowing the strawberry to pass along the conveyor belt. In the
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context of the reanalyzed memorial experiments, this may mean that participants are poised to
accept that a presented item is either “old” or “new” depending on the manipulation, unless
becoming aware of any evidence to the contrary.
The DCV and delta plot analysis point to what should be a DM divergent account of bias
in recognition memory. However, despite a review of the literature and substantial effort, the
parameters do not produce a divergent account (except in one case) and instead the convergent
account is repeatedly evident in the DM data. It is not clear why that is the case.
One possibility is that the standard DM assumptions do not provide a full account of
processing bias in memory decisions. Below I discuss one possibility, that the assumption of a
constant drift rate over time is inappropriate for describing biased memorial decisions. I explore
the concept of a time-varying drift rate and borrow models and assumptions from the executive
control literature from conflict tasks.

Bias in Memory as Conflict
Considering the similarity between the experiments discussed here and conflict tasks,
comparing the results presented here to results derived from conflict tasks could be informative.
Decisions in favor of the biased response tend to be faster than those of the other responses in
memorial tasks. In conflict tasks, congruent trials tend to illicit faster responses than incongruent
trials (Pratte, Rouder, & Morey, 2010; Spieler, Balota, & Faust, 1996). Also, here I show that the
responses with the larger mean RT, induced via bias for the other response, are the same, or even
less variable than the other correct response. While the DCV analysis technique has not yet been
used in the analysis on conflict tasks, these tasks often produce a pattern of data reminiscent of
the one described here in the context of response bias in memory. Namely, patterns of data that
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violate the linearity described by Wagenmakers & Brown (2007)(e.g., Pratte, Rouder & Morey,
2010).
From the DM perspective, both of these tasks involve accumulating evidence overtime
until a decision boundary is reached. The average rate that evidence accumulation is represented
by the drift rate parameter of the model. Irrespective of bias, a DM fit to recognition memory
data would produce two drift rates: one for the rate of evidence accumulation for targets, and
another for foils. This is the case because there is reason to believe that the rate in which
evidence accumulates when presented with a target would be different than when presented with
a foil.
For conflict tasks, this would be akin to assigning a separate drift rate and variability in
drift for congruent and incongruent trials. This is antithetical to the design of conflict tasks
because the stimulus which indicates the correct response is always the same or has some
common feature for congruent and incongruent trials. Thus, it follows that there should be some
common contribution to the evidence accumulation process between congruent and incongruent
trials that represents the influence of the relevant stimulus. Further, to simplify, the purpose of
conflict task analysis is to elucidate the influence of the conflicting information on the decisionmaking process. Allowing for an entirely different drift rate for congruent and incongruent trials
would not mirror the design of conflict tasks, and more importantly, wouldn’t add any
conceptual insight into the influence of conflicting information on the decision-making process.
For simple memorial decisions, it is sensible to allow for a separate drift rate for targets
and foils. This is because these drift rates would represent the average evidence accumulation
toward the correct “old” and “new” boundaries respectively (assuming accuracy is above
chance). Thus, if drift rate and variability in drift rates can be assessed separately for target and
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foil trials, this in and of itself should be sufficient to produce DCVs produced by the most
extreme bias manipulations.
However, this becomes complicated because while lowering the drift rate will increase
the mean RT of the produced distributions, the variability of the distribution will also increase
linearly (Wagenmakers & Brown, 2007). This means that the drift variability parameter would
have to decrease substantially as the drift rate lowers to counteract the fact that the variability of
the produced RT distribution will increase as the drift rate decreases but decreasing the drift
variability parameter can only counteract the increasing variability produced from a decreased
drift rate to a certain degree. For a potentially useful analogy, consider a young person who is
growing taller but also wants to lose weight. Growing taller will necessarily result in weighing
more but could be counteracted to some degree by diet and/or exercise.
As I will discuss in greater detail later, conflict tasks like the Simon task are accounted
for in a way that is similar to the divergent account in that the evidence accumulation process
changes throughout the time course of the decision-making process. While the divergent account
does not represent a change in the evidence accumulation process per se, it does entail
parameters in opposition, one (starting point) that has a particular impact on early decisions as
compared to the other (drift bias).
I believe that there is compelling insight to be had through acknowledgment of the
analogous relationship between conflict tasks and bias in simple memorial decisions. Thus, I
hope this inspires other researchers to utilize the analysis techniques developed to account for
conflict tasks and apply them to memorial tasks. That being said, this is one of many potential
frameworks with which to interpret these results and may fall short of accounting for the subtle
effects of bias in memorial decisions.
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Summary
Overall, there appears to be a counter intuitive relationship between mean RT and
variance between correct RT distributions across different levels of bias in simple memorial
decisions. Specifically, response bias manipulations result in an RT distribution for correct
responses favored by the bias manipulation that are more variable relative to their mean as
compared to the other (not favored by the bias manipulation) correct response RT distribution.
This systematic relationship is not directly accounted for in any sequential sampling model
representations and thus needs to be addressed in order to properly account for the influence of
bias in memory. This pattern can be easily identified using the DCV and appears to be in line
with the divergent parameter DM account, placing starting point in favor of the bias
manipulation, and drift bias favoring the other response.
Part III: Stimulus Bias

Stimulus bias refers to a situation where participants are biased to consider a specific
subset of the studied items as “old” at test based on some common element or elements amongst
the stimuli. For example, if you see a group of people committing a crime and they all have
beards, when identifying potential suspects, you may consider beards as particularly strong
evidence. The strength of this phenomenon can be represented by comparing some metric
indicating how often a participant calls one type of stimuli “old” compared to another type of
stimuli. This is often induced via category membership wherein some proportion of the study
items are members of the same category, sometimes mixed with items that are not related to each
other, considered unrelated items. At test, participants are typically asked to respond “old” or
“new” and the test consists of randomly intermixed studied and unstudied related and unrelated
items. This design generally results in a bias to consider related items as “old” – both those that
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are studied and unstudied. In terms of RTs, items which are members of a category tend to elicit
faster “old” responses compared to unrelated items (Hancock, Hicks, Marsh & Ritschel, 2003).
A pattern of accuracy and RT like that just described for a typical stimulus bias paradigm
is characteristic of a change in the starting point parameter of the DM. However, conceptually,
the DM cannot account for this effect through changes in starting point. This is because starting
point is meant to account for the relative amount of evidence necessary to make a decision,
which is set before a stimulus is presented on any given trial. Because the typical test list
contains a mix of items, the starting point must be the same for all conditions. For example, if
you are attending your high school reunion, you are expecting to encounter former classmates
before you arrive. This expectation would conceptually map onto starting point. Thus, if the type
of stimuli presented is necessary to dictate the placement of starting point, this conflicts with
how the starting point parameter is conceptualized. How then do we reconcile the pattern of
empirical data with the theoretical framing of the DM? White and Poldrack (2014) showed that
properly executed stimulus bias paradigms target the drift rates rather than starting point
parameter of the DM, and thus produce a different pattern of RTs than the response bias pattern
discussed above. However, here I have already shown that the DM fit to response bias data can
produce a set of parameters (the congruent account) that differs from those inferred by the DCV
analysis (divergent account). With this in mind, I take a disparate approach here to address the
pattern of RTs produced when stimulus bias is manipulated.
The approach I adopt is to consider an alternate data analysis technique that can provide
additional information about the time course of the influence of stimulus bias. If the influence of
stimulus bias changes over the course of a decision, then this suggests that a more complex
version of the diffusion model is required, such as the Spotlight Model (White, Ratcliff & Starns,
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2011) The Diffusion Model for Conflict Tasks (Ulrich, Schröter, Leuthold, & Birngruber, 2015)
and the Dual Stage Two Phase Model (Hübner, Steinhauser, & Lehle, 2010). These models all
include an additional parameter or set of parameters incorporated into the standard DM which
allow for the rate that evidence is accumulated to change throughout the decision-making
process, and that the rate of change can be, in some way, represented by the additional parameter
or set of parameters.
There is some evidence to suggest that the role of stimulus bias might be quite different
earlier compared to later in the decision-making process. For example, Dosher, McElree, Hood
& Rosedale (1989) showed that it takes longer to respond correctly to an unstudied word when
primed with a semantically related word compared to being primed with an unrelated word.
Also, when presented with a target, correct responses are relatively quick when primed with a
semantically related word compared to an unrelated prime. They interpret these results as
evidence that participants pick up on the semantic relation between the prime and the test item
and correct for this influence over the time course of the decision. However, participants are
aware that the relation between the prime and the test item is irrelevant and are therefore
motivated to suppress this influence. Thus, this experiment does not directly inform on situations
where semantic relatedness is a factor to be considered without an explicit understanding of its
utility in the decision-making process.
Rotello & Heit (1999) had participants study a list of words and then tested them with the
studied words mixed with related and unrelated unstudied words. They also presented
participants with a signal indicating when they should respond. The signal varied from 100 to
2000 ms after the stimulus presentation. They found that the rate in which related unstudied
words were called “old” increased until around a 500 ms response time and then remained at that
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level for later responses. They propose that this is indicative of a familiarity-based process in
which different information becomes available at different times.
Both of these experiments hint at the possibility that the factors which influence evidence
accumulation in the context of item similarity vary over the time course of the decision. Here I
extend these findings by utilizing an experimental design that positions semantic similarity as an
aspect of the stimuli which is not explicitly relevant or irrelevant in order to create situation
where semantic similarity is processed in an unconfounded way. Also, I utilize a delta plot
analysis technique as a way to better gauge how semantic similarity is processed throughout the
time course of decisions.
Analyzing Delta Plots
The techniques used to quantify delta plots can be grouped into two distinct
approaches. First is the model based approach which, as the name implies, requires a specific
model. In this case, the model of choice is the activation-suppression model (Ridderinkhof,
2002a, 2002b). This model postulates that when exposed to task irrelevant incongruent
information, one must suppress the incorrect response, and that this process takes time.
According to this dual-process model, an automatic process is responsive to the task irrelevant
incongruent information, and a top-down executive control process suppresses this automatic
process. This suppression is assumed to build up over time and is therefore more efficient for
slower responses compared to faster ones. As a reminder, a delta plot depicts the RT difference
between incongruent and congruent trials across the time course of the decisions. If the delta plot
at any given x-axis value has a positive y-axis value, it means that the incongruent trials took the
corresponding y-axis value longer than congruent trials at the respective point in the time course
of the decisions. Thus, the time course of the RT difference between incongruent and congruent
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trials can be measured by analyzing the slopes between quantiles across the delta plot/s. Take the
case of an increasing then decreasing delta plot or increasing then flattening out delta plot;
according to Ridderinkhof (2002a) this would imply that the irrelevant information provided in
the incongruent trials interferes with one’s ability to produce the correct response (early
increasing) and this interference diminishes for later decisions (later decreasing/flattening delta
plot). Thus, the slope of the last portion of the delta plot is considered to be an appropriate
measure of the strength of the inhibitory process. As a brief note, Ulrich, Schröter, Leuthold &
Birngruber (2015) propose a model that accounts for the variety of delta plot shapes without the
need of a suppression mechanism. Instead, the early automatic process is represented as a pulse
function that increases and decreases at a rate contingent on the influence of the irrelevant
incongruent information. This automatic process is incorporated into a static controlled process
influenced by the task relevant information. To be clear, the authors note that an active
suppression mechanism could be modeled with this same mechanism. Irrespective of the
differences between the assumptions of these models, they are both supported by a delta plot
portion by portion slope analysis. The limitation here is that this analysis and interpretation is
model specific.
The second approach, which does not require a specific cognitive architecture, is to
assume that the delta plots are linear and to compare the slopes of delta plots between conditions.
Any differences between delta plot slopes are assumed to be driven by different cognitive
processes and is usually utilized when there are conflicting results regarding the slope of the
produced delta plot (positive, flat or negative) as it relates to any given experimental design (see,
Ellinghaus & Miller, 2018; Pratte et al., 2010). While this approach has merit in some situations,
it has the obvious limitation when there is evidence of non-linearity in that any insight in this
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regard would be lost. I utilize both of these techniques to shed light on the time course of
stimulus bias in recognition memory with a few caveats and details discussed below.
Considering the fact that this is largely an exploratory analysis of the time course of
stimulus bias in recognition memory, I will utilize a combination of the aforementioned
approaches in order to comprehensively gauge aspects of the time course of responses which are
influenced in a way that is linked to the stimulus bias. Thus, I devised experiments with
conditions in which stimulus bias is present, but to varying degrees in order to highlight what
differs between delta plots when the strength of stimulus bias increases.

Stimulus Bias: Semantic Similarity
In this experiment semantic similarity is manipulated to introduce a bias in the
stimuli. This experiment consists of a 3x2x2 mixed design. I also manipulated the instructions of
each condition and composition of each test type, both of which have been shown to affect bias.

The three levels of the first manipulation (condition) are meant to manipulate the way in
which the items are encoded in order to increase or decrease the resulting stimulus bias. Within
the DRM paradigm, two studies have shown that instructions to reduce bias are effective. Miller,
Guerin and Wolford (2011) showed that warning participants of the related word “old” bias
between study and test partially diminished the bias. Gallo, Roediger & McDermott (2001)
showed that informing participants about the bias to consider related words “old” before they
studied the words abolished bias at test. I used the Gallo et al. instructions to maximize the
effect. Finally, in a recognition memory paradigm, Jacoby (1991) showed that having
participants conduct a divided attention task while completing the test phase of a recognition
memory experiment results in a stronger influence of what he calls the “early automatic
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process.” I extend this reasoning to predict that divided attention will increase stimulus-specific
bias because participants will have fewer cognitive resource to devote to discriminating between
the item-specific and category information in making their recognition decision. I anticipate that
these three experiments span low to high reliance on stimulus-specific bias in the decision
process.

In order to optimize the probability that the data from this experiment produced a span of
the overall number of “old” responses for related words compared to unrelated words (stimulus
bias), I also included a manipulation of the composition of the test list (test type). Some
participants were tested on a mix of related and unrelated items and others I tested in a blocked
fashion; all the related words and then all of the unrelated words and vice versa. I included this
manipulation because block testing has been shown to diminish stimulus bias when tested on a
mix of related and unrelated items (Starns, White & Ratcliff, 2010).

Participants

Syracuse University undergraduate students participated in the experiment for course
credit. Participants were included if their d’ was positive, this resulted in the exclusion of 12
participants, the number of participants per condition is as follows. Mixed divided attention: 50,
mixed normal: 48, mixed warning: 50, blocked divided attention: 45, blocked normal: 50,
blocked warning: 45. Some participants also failed to return to the laboratory for the third and
final condition.
Materials
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Participants studied and were tested on an equal mix of related (negative emotional) and
unrelated words matched for normative word frequency from White et al., (2014). The
negatively emotional- unrelated pools were sampled from the ANEW pool of words, with a total
of 96 negative emotional words and 96 length and frequency matched unrelated words (Bradley
& Lang, 1999). In-lab experiments were conducted with MATLAB using the PsychToolbox.
Procedure

Each participant received all three conditions (instructions to reduce bias, baseline, and
divided attention) with unrelated and negative emotional words. All participants received the
baseline condition first and the other two conditions in random order, the third condition being
administered two days after the first session.

The experimental details were the same for all three conditions and are described next.
Participants performed 1 study/distractor/test list cycle per condition. Each study list consists of
96 words studied for 3 second each with no encoding task. A 90 second math task served as a
distractor. Each test list has 192 (half old, half new; half related, half unrelated) trials in a single
item recognition memory task where participant press a button to indicate if the word was
studied or not studied in the most recent list. For the instruction to reduce bias condition,
participants will read the following before beginning the experiment: “You are now going to take
another recognition test, but with different words. Again, some of the words will be words that
were on the study list, and some of the words will not have been on the study list. As you
complete the recognition test this time, I would like you to be very careful about saying “old” to
any word. Many of the words you will study are composed of words that form a central theme.
For example, the following study list could contain these words: “apple, strawberry, orange,
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pear, mango, banana, watermelon, grape, cherry.” Given that these words are all fruit, very
often, people will falsely recognize other fruit that were not included in the study list. Not only
will they falsely recognize other fruit, they will do so confidently. This task is meant to cause
memory distortions, and it’s meant to trip you up. In this test, I would like you to avoid saying
“old” and falsely recognizing these words that were not included on the study list but match the
theme of the study list. A good rule to use in order to avoid falsely recognizing a word is to be
very careful in saying “yes” to any word that is strongly related to the study list theme.”

For the divided attention condition, participants were asked to primarily focus on a
listening task while performing the recognition memory task. The listening task involves the
participants listening to an audio recording of a list of numbers and indicating when they hear the
target sequence. The target sequence is any 3 consecutive odd numbers. A number will be heard
every 1.5 seconds. A target sequence was presented within 1-5 numbers of the previous target
sequence. Participants were asked to say “now” out loud into a microphone when they hear the
target sequence.

Data Analysis

Descriptive Statistics

To reiterate, the overarching goal is an exploratory analysis of the time course in the
context of stimulus bias. Thus, the data analysis is focused with this goal in mind. However, it is
important that differences in stimulus bias are compared in situations where other relevant
factors are the same, in as much as is possible. One critical factor beyond stimulus bias is overall
accuracy. Thus, I want to compare differences in stimulus bias between condition when accuracy
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is the same. To that end, I include two preliminary analyses in order to structure the way in
which I compare the difference in time course across stimulus bias conditions.

These two analyses are meant to quantify the strength of the stimulus bias and the
accuracy of responses. To accomplish this goal, I used SDT d’ as a measure of accuracy, and C,
the SDT measure for criterion placement to measure bias. The formula to calculate d’ is as
follows, with H being the hit rate and FA being the false alarm rate:
d’ = z(H)-z(FA)

The formula to calculate C is as follows:

C = -((z(H)+z(FA))/2
A positive value of C is indicative of a conservative criterion and is a result of there
being fewer hits and false alarms for the relevant set of words. Alternatively, a negative value of
C is indicative of a liberal criterion and is a result of there being many hits and false alarms for
the relevant set of words.

Proportion “Old” Time Course Analysis
In order to assess how bias responding plays out across the time course of decisions I
compute the proportion of “old” responses binned based on when the responses occurred using
the same cut-offs as for the delta plots (.1,.3,.5,.7,.9). This allows for comparing the difference in
“old” responding separated by type of stimuli so that the relative gap in “old” responding for
unrelated compared to related items can be compared between conditions.
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Delta Plot Analysis
Each condition in this experiment contributes a time course of responses for related
and unrelated words, and thus corresponding delta plots. Here I take the approach of comparing
the time course of responding to related words as compared to unrelated items. Then to also
compare the relationship between related and unrelated item delta plots between conditions
where stimulus bias is relatively strong, as assessed via C.
I present three analyses of the delta plots. First is to analyze the earliest quantile point
between related and unrelated words to test if this gap differs between conditions with high and
low stimulus bias. Analyzing the earliest quantile is used as a measure of the interference as it
relates to stimulus bias. This is motivated by the fact that any suppression would have to come
after interference. Thus, I used the earliest quantile as a measure of interference under the
assumption that any suppression would be minimal. This can be taken as the difference in delta
plots between related and unrelated words at the earliest time point.
Second, I compute a linear regression on the delta plots between the .1 and .7
quantiles as a way to test for potential differences in inhibition and/or suppression as a function
of stimulus bias.
Finally, I compute the slope between the latest two quantiles points (.7 & .9) as a
more fine-grained measure of suppression. I compare these slopes between stimulus bias
conditions. The interpretation of this analysis, like the previous one discussed, needs to be
considered in the context of the other two analyses.

Results
Descriptive Statistics
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Two mixed 3x2x2 ANOVAs were conducted with condition (Divided attention,
normal and warning) and word type (related and unrelated) as the within factors and test type
(blocked and mixed) as the between factor with d’ and C as the dependent variables. There is a
significant main effect of d’ across conditions [F(1, 164) = 68.1, p < .001] and word type [F(1,
91) = 25.25, p < .001] and a significant condition and word type interaction [F(2, 182) = 3.64, p
= .028] all others are not significant. There is a significant main effect of C across word type
[F(1, 91) = 279, p < .001] and a significant interaction of test type and word type [F(1, 91) =
64.2, p < .001]. All others are not significant (See Figure 13).
There are a few critical results depicted above that need to be discussed further in
order to justify the following delta plot analysis as it relates to the time course of semantic
similarity. First, d’ is significantly different across condition. Thus, in order to compare
difference in stimulus bias without this comparison being contaminated by differences in
discriminability, I cannot compare between conditions. There is no significant difference in d’
between test type. Thus, test type is a good candidate for comparisons of stimulus bias. Further,
there is significant main effect of C for word type and the interaction of C of test type and word
type and critically, a lack of a significant main effect of C for test type. This means that
participants responded ‘old’ far more for related words, and less for unrelated words, and that
this gap increased in the mixed test type compared to the blocked test type. Also, the lack of a
main effect of C on test type alone means that there was not overall difference in bias between
block and mixed tests, just between the word types across test types.
However, there is a significant main effect of d’ for word type. This means that there
were potential differences in discriminability between related and unrelated words overall. While
this is not ideal, this effect is far weaker than the main effect of C for word types. This harkens
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back to the long standing debate regarding the proper way to measure bias separately from
discriminability (see Dougal & Rotello, 2007; Macmillan & Creelman, 2005; Malmberg, 2002;
Grider & Malmberg, 2008). That being said, this is a limitation of the current study and will be
discussed in greater detail in the discussion section.
The overarching conclusion here is that the analyses using delta plots in order to
explore differences in the time course of stimulus bias will focus primarily on the differences
between the test types within each of the three conditions.

Figure 13. Experiment 1 D' and C Data. Gray and white bars represent data derived from the analysis of related and unrelated
items, respectively. Error bars depict standard error
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Proportion “Old” Time Course Analysis
In order to quantify the time course of “old” responses and compare between stimulus
type and condition, I computed a total of fifteen mixed 2X2 ANOVAs (no mathematical
correction was made for multiple comparisons) with word type as a within factor and test type as
a between factor (depicted in Figure 14). The dependent variables were each of the proportion
“old” points for each experiment. Comparing the divided attention mixed and blocked
conditions, there was a significant main effect of word type for every quantile point ([F(1, 92) =
18.5, p < .001], [F(1, 92) = 26.7, p < .001], ([F(1, 92) = 11.8, p < .001], ([F(1, 92) = 8.9, p =
.003], ([F(1, 92) = 12.6, p < .001]). There was one significant interaction between word type and
test type at the .3 quantile proportion “old” dependent variable as well ([F(1, 92) = 7.4, p = .007].
Taken together, these results indicate that for both divided attention conditions, the proportion of
“old” responses are higher for related words compared to unrelated words across the time course
and that this difference was significantly higher in the mixed compared to the blocked condition
at the .3 quantiles.
The results of the proportion “old” time course analysis for the normal conditions are
similar to the divided attention. There was a significant main effect of word type at each quantile
point ([F(1, 92) = 16.3, p < .001], [F(1, 92) = 15.8, p < .001], ([F(1, 92) = 12.6, p < .001], ([F(1,
92) = 4, p = .047], ([F(1, 92) = 8.2, p <= .005]). There was also a significant interaction at the .1
and .3 quantile points ([F(1, 92) = 6.1, p = .014], [F(1, 92) = 7.1, p = .008]). This indicates, as in
the divided attention conditions, the proportion of “old” responses are higher for related words
compared to unrelated words across the time course and that this difference was significantly
higher in the mixed condition at the .1 and .3 quantiles.
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The results of the proportion “old” time course analysis for the warning conditions are
similar to the divided attention and normal conditions but with a few interesting differences.
There was a significant main effect of word type at each quantile point except for the final .9
point ([F(1, 92) = 14.1, p < .001], [F(1, 92) = 18.5, p < .001], ([F(1, 92) = 17.4, p < .001], ([F(1,
92) = 5.9, p = .016]). There was also a significant interaction between word type and test type at
the .3 and .5, .7 and .9 quantile points ([F(1, 92) = 5.8, p = .017], [F(1, 92) = 6.2, p = .013], [F(1,
92) = 4.6, p = .034], [F(1, 92) = 4.5, p = .035]). This indicates, as in the divided attention and
normal conditions, the proportion of “old” responses are higher for related words compared to
unrelated words except for the final quantile point. Surprisingly, the significant interaction
between word type and test type persists in all except the .1 quantile point, indicating a larger
divide in “old” responding between related and unrelated words in the mixed condition in all but
the .1 quantile point. Thus, it appears that “old” bias in general happens for earlier responses, but
is also present in the blocked conditions along with the mixed condition.
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Figure 14. Experiment 1 Proportion "Old" Responses Binned by RT. Solid and dashed lines depict studied and unstudied items,
respectively. Errors bars depict standard error.

Time Course (Delta plot) Analyses
The first analysis compares the .1 quantile delta RT point between related and
unrelated words and between mixed and blocked test types. I did this analysis one time for each
of the conditions of the experiment. Thus, three mixed 2x2 ANOVAs were conducted with word
type as a within factor and test type as the between factor. There is a significant main effect of
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word type but not test type and a significant interaction of test type and word time on the .1
quantile delta RT in the divided attention and warning conditions (Divided attention word type:
[F(1, 92) = 5.6, p = .02], divided attention interaction: [F(1, 92) = 4.45, p = .038], warning word
type: [F(1, 92) = 23.4, p < .001], warning interaction [F(1, 92) = 4.6, p = .034]). However, there
are no significant results within the normal condition. I believe that this is not due to any
fundamental difference within that condition as compared to the other two. Instead, it appears to
be a result of a lack of power within the experiment. This is highlighted by the fact that t.tests
comparing the .1 quantile delta RT between unrelated and related words is significantly different
for the mixed test type condition but not for the blocked test type condition (Mixed: [t(87) = 2.9,
p = .005], Blocked: [t(74) = .26, p = .79]). To summarize, these results indicate that there is a gap
between the .1 quantile of related and unrelated word delta RT and that this gap is larger in the
mixed test condition as compared to the block test condition. Meaning that the gap in the earliest
responses between hit and correct rejections for related items is larger if the words are mixed at
test compared to blocked.
Next, I computed linear regressions on the delta plots and ran a 2x2 mixed ANOVA
with word type as the within and test type as the between factor. I did this for both dependent
variables of the slope of the linear regression computed on the .1 to .7 quantile delta plot points
and on the .7 to .9 delta plot points. To summarize, there were no significant differences across
the board for either of these analyses. With the exploratory nature of this work in mind, I also
computed other linear regressions of the delta plots (.1 to .5,.1 to .3, .3 to .7) and found no
significant differences in the delta plot slope indicating that the overall shape of the delta plots
does not vary between word type or test type factors (see Figure 15 for depiction of delta plots).
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Figure 15. Delta RT Plots of Experiment 1 Data. Solid and dashed lines depict delta RTs computed from studied and unstudied
item correct response RTs, respectively. Errors bars depict standard error.
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Conclusion
Here I manipulated semantic similarity through test list composition in the form of
block testing or mixed testing of related and unrelated words. This was accomplished in three
different conditions, or contexts, one with no extra manipulation, one where participants’
attention was divided during study, and another when participants were warned regarding the
effect of word category membership before the study phase. First, I found that d’ was similar
within conditions, and that within each condition the C for related words was significantly
different than the C for unrelated words, and that this gap was larger in the mixed test types
compared to the blocked test types.
Analysis of the delta plots show that stimulus bias appears to coincide with
differences in the .1 quantile between related and unrelated delta plots. Further analyses show
that this is the only difference between delta plots as a function of stimulus bias. This means that
the delta plots between related and unrelated delta plots differ in the first quantile in that the
related delta plot have a more positive first quantile point as compared to unrelated, and this
difference is larger when stronger stimulus bias is induced. Then, to see if this difference grows
or diminishes, I showed that middle section of the delta plot slope does not differ, and neither
does the end section. This implies that influence of stimulus bias impacts initial responses, and
that this difference remains, but does not grow throughout the decision-making process. This
lack of growth throughout the decision-making process indicates a change in the evidence
accumulation process across time that could not be accounted for with a constant rate of
evidence accumulation.
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Before I discuss interpretation of these results in greater detail, I want to test the
scope of these results by testing whether these results hold for stimulus bias beyond semantic
similarity. To achieve this goal, I use images and vary the common features of these images in
order to induce stimulus bias. Thus, what follows is my next experiment using flower images to
induce stimulus bias based in perceptual rather than conceptual knowledge in order to analyze
the corresponding delta plots in the same way as the current experiment.

Experiment 2
The goal of Experiment 2 is to test whether the findings found in the prior experiment can
be replicated when stimulus bias is induced in the lab, and not based on predefined semantic
categories. I do this by adopting the experimental design of De Brigard, Brady, Ruzic, &
Schacter (2017). To summarize, they had participants learn to categorize flower-like stimuli
based on the feature of one dimension. The stimuli had another dimension that was irrelevant to
the categorization task. This results in four different stimulus categories: those with the learned
dimension, those with the irrelevant dimension, both, and neither. A typical recognition memory
task followed this learning session. Participants had a bias to call members of the learned
category “old” at test, and a weaker bias to consider members of the unlearned category “old” at
test compared to the stimuli with neither dimension. This is because both the relevant and
irrelevant feature are presented more often than the two other features in their respective
dimension. However, the act of categorizing the stimuli based on a feature resulted in a stronger
“old” bias. I rely on this same category structure except I do not include an irrelevant feature,
only a learned one. This was partially for the sake of simplicity, and also to maximize the
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number of trials with only learned or only not learned features so that there was sufficient data to
compared between these two sets. In the future, it would be interesting to include the irrelevant
feature stimuli to see if the findings here are present, to a lesser degree in the responses to those
stimuli as well.
Participants
Syracuse University undergraduate students participated in the experiment for course
credit. Participants were included if they had a positive d’ or if they failed to achieve the learning
criterion. If participants were subjected to the learning phase, they had to achieve at least 80%
accuracy in the last section of the learning phase, this is discussed in greater detail below. As a
result, data from 61 participants with the learning condition included and 85 participants without
the learning condition were analyzed.
Materials
The materials consist of truncated set of 768 of the 1,024 flowers generated in
MATLAB by De Brigard et al., (2017). The flowers were created to have five different
dimensions, with each dimension having three possible features: 1) number of petals: 2,4, or 6;
2) color of petals: red, blue, or green; 3) shape of center: circle, triangle, or square; 4) color of
the center: orange, pink, or bright green; and 5) number of sepals: 0, 1, or 2.
Procedure
The category learning stage following De Brigard, et al (2017). During the learning stage,
participants are told that they will see a flower on the screen and they have to decide if this
flower belongs to the species avlonia. Participants were told that avlonias differed from all other
flowers in one simple way, and a few examples were given. Examples include any one feature of
any dimension of the flowers. For example, participants could be shown a 6 petal flower, and are
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told that avlonias could differ from other flowers in that they have 6 petals and other flowers do
not. Participants were informed regarding the five dimensions that can be varied across stimuli
and were shown two examples of flowers to highlight these dimensions (e.g., number of petals,
shape of center, shape of petals). If participants are in the learning condition, they were then told
that they will see a total of 60 flowers and will be asked whether each flower is an avlonia or not.
As participants completed this task, they indicated whether or not they believe each given
stimulus is an avlonia by pressing a button corresponding to a “yes” or “no” decision. They were
given feedback on each trial of the learning stage. Participants were told that they will have to
guess what makes an avlonia an avlonia but will eventually figure it out. Unbeknownst to the
participants, half of the learning trials would contain the feature of the dimension that makes the
flower an avlonia. For example, 50% of the flowers would have a square center, indicating they
are avlonia, 25% would have a circular and 25% triangle center, none of which are avlonia. In
this case, square centered flower stimuli would be considered avlonia, here we will refer to these
flowers as majority feature flowers, and the others, which are not avlonia (circle and triangle
centers) are referred to as minority feature flowers.
After the learning stage, participants in the learning stage condition begin the memory
stage. None of the stimuli presented during the learning stage were presented during the memory
stage – the purpose of the learning stage is simply to create categories. The memory stage
consists of two study – test blocks which include 20 studied flowers and 40 tested flowers each.
Half of all flowers include the feature that was used to determine status as avlonia in the
categorization stage (majority feature flowers). Participants were randomly assigned to one of
two groups, one group completed the learning stage before the memory stage, the other group
proceeded directly to the memory stage. The stimuli were of the same composition in the

84
memory stage for all participants. The study list consists of a random sample of flower features
except that half of the flowers were avlonia (had the majority feature) and the others did not.
Thus, the overrepresentation of majority feature should induce a stimulus bias for circular center
flowers, and this should be stronger for the participants that learned this feature in the learning
stage. The purpose of this is to induce a stronger stimulus bias, contingent on the learned
category during the learning stage as compared to participants that did not complete the learning
stage.

Results
Learning stage
There is a total of 60 trials in the learning phase. I binned these trials into 6 ten trial
bins and computed the accuracy within each bin. In order to be included in the following
analyses participants had to achieve over 80% accuracy in the final bin in the learning stage. This
resulted in the exclusion of 10 participants. See Figure 16 for the overall learning curve.
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Figure 16. Experiment 2 Learning Phase Data. Percent correct across trials, 6 bins of 10 trials each. Error bars depict standard
error.

Descriptive Statistics
Two 2x2 mixed ANOVAs (depicted in Figure 17) were conducted with/without learning
stage as the between factor and minority/majority feature flowers as the within subject factor for
the dependent variables d’ and C. D’ is not significant for both main effects and interaction. For
C as the dependent variable, there was a significant main effect of minority/majority feature
flowers [F(1, 147) = 51.6, p < .001] and a significant interaction with minority/majority feature
flowers and with/without learning phase [F(1, 147) = 5.32, p = .022]. Thus, there are no
differences in d’ between conditions but there are differences in C between minority/majority
feature flowers which means that there was a stimulus bias for majority feature flowers in that
they are considered “old” more than minority feature flowers, and this stimulus bias was
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diminished for the participants that did not complete the learning stage prior to engaging in the
memory phase of the experiment. These results in conjunction with the fact that there were no
significant differences in d’ allow for me to compare the delta plots as was done in the previous
experiment with the without learning condition working as the relatively low stimulus bias
condition, and the with learning phase condition working as the stronger stimulus bias condition.

Figure 17. Experiment 2 D' and C Data. Gray and white bars represent data derived from the analysis of majority and minority
feature items, respectively. Error bars depict standard error.
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Proportion “Old” Time Course Analysis
In order to quantify the time course of “old” responses and compare between stimulus
type and condition, I computed a total of 5 mixed 2X2 ANOVAs with minority/majority feature
flowers as a within factor and with or without learning as a between factor. The dependent
variables were each of the proportion “old” points for each experiment. There was a significant
main effect of flower type for every quantile point ([F(1, 147) = 13.8, p < .001], [F(1, 147) =
9.15, p < .003], ([F(1, 147) = 12, p < .001], ([F(1, 147) = 6.7, p = .01], ([F(1, 147) = 4.7, p <
.031]). There was one significant interaction between minority/majority feature flowers and with
/ without learning the .1 quantile proportion “old” dependent variable ([F(1, 147) = 4, p = .046].
Taken together, these results indicate that for both conditions, the proportion of “old” responses
are higher for majority feature flowers compared to minority feature flowers across the time
course and that this difference was significantly higher in the learning compared to the without
learning condition at the .1 quantile (depicted in Figure 18).
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Figure 18. Experiment 2 Proportion "Old" Responses Binned by RT. Solid and dashed lines depict majority and minority feature
items, respectively. Errors bars depict standard error.

Time Course (Delta plot) Analyses
The first analysis is the .1 quantile comparison using the same 2x2 mixed ANOVA
structure as discussed in the previous section. This was not significant for both main effects and
the interaction. Thus, in staying true to the exploratory nature of this pursuit, I also used the .3
delta quantile as a dependent variable. This resulted in a significant main effect of
minority/majority feature flower [F(1, 147) = 7.34, p = .008] and a significant interaction [F(1,
147) = 4.37, p = .038]. This mean that the gap between minority/majority feature flower at the .3
quantile is significant and this gap is significantly larger in the with learning phase condition
compared to without. Considering this result, I chose the .3 to .7 quantile portion of the delta
plots for a linear regression to compare slopes and, as in the previous experiment, the .7 to .9
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portion as well. These analyses produced non-significant results across the board. Taken
together, this means that categorizing flowers based on a feature results in a larger gap between
correctly identifying and rejecting the flowers that include the categorized feature of interest.
Further, this effect on the RT distributions does not appear to persist for later decisions, once
again leading to the conclusion that the influence of stimulus bias impacts earlier decisions
(although not as early as the previous experiment) and this influence is diminished for later
decisions, supporting the possibility that the rate of evidence accumulation changes across the
time course of the decision (depicted in Figure 19).

Figure 19. Delta RT Plots of Experiment 2. Solid and dashed lines depict delta RTs computed from majority and minority feature
item correct response RTs, respectively. Errors bars depict standard error.
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Conclusion
Here I show that inducing stimulus bias through a laboratory manipulation using
images produces similar, but not identical results of a time course of bias analysis as compared to
semantic similarity induced stimulus bias. The main difference is that the gap between the
stimulus bias delta plot compared to the other delta plot appears to increase later on throughout
the decision-making process compared to the semantic similarity stimulus bias experiment.
Similarly, this experiment also depicted no difference in the time course of stimulus bias beyond
the initial difference found in the early portion of the delta plot. The reason for the different
result between experiment 1 and 2 is unclear. However, it stands to reason that it could have
something to do with the time course of word vs. image processing and specifically with the type
of images chosen for this experiment. It could be that it takes longer to orient oneself to the
flower images as compared to words when presented during the task. While this is strictly
speculation, it would imply that the underlying influence of stimulus bias is similar, just that it
takes longer for the process to unfold because of the difference in the time to takes to identify the
presented stimuli. The delta plots produced in Experiment 1 & 2 differ, and thus, stimulus bias
induced by semantic similarity vs. common feature exert different influences that warrant future
investigation. That being said, there is interesting common ground between the results of these
experiments; it appears that stimulus bias primarily influences the earlier portion of the decisionmaking process and that this phenomenon does not continue to exert influence, or at least
diminishes in influence for later decisions. I discuss this in greater detail in the next section.

91
Discussion
Here I showed that stimulus bias induced through semantic similarity and through
common image features results in a difference in the .1 (semantic similarity) and .3 (image
feature similarity) quantiles of the delta plots between related and unrelated items.
The overarching conclusion from these experiments is that the induction of stimulus
bias appears to influence early decisions, but these influences do not continue to build for later
decisions. An interpretation of these results can be gained by continuing the analogy with the
conflict task literature. For example, Ridderinkhof, Scheres, Oosterlaan & Sergeant (2005) had
participants with and without ADHD complete the flanker task and analyzed the data using delta
plots. They showed that participants with ADHD tended to produce positively going delta plots.
In the context of the flanker task, this means that the difference between incongruent and
congruent trial response times increases across the segments of the respective distributions.
Conceptually, this is interpreted as evidence that the participants with ADHD are influenced by
the irrelevant incongruent flankers and this influence is exerted even for later decisions. Thus,
these participants are unable or partially unable to suppress the influence of the flankers and
presumable have difficulty focusing their attention on only the relevant stimulus. To contrast this
with the results presented here, the fact that the related and unrelated item delta plots do not
continue to differ for later quantiles between conditions with low and high stimulus bias imply
that the influence of the categorical information does not continue to exert influence, or this
influence is diminished, for later decisions compared to early ones. Thus, an analogous result is
not the participants with ADHD, but instead the control participants. The control participants
produce delta plots that are positive and grow across the first two quantiles, but the positive
growth does not continue past the point of the 2nd quantile. This is interpreted as a representation
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of the control participants’ initially being influenced by the irrelevant incongruent flankers, but
that this influence is suppressed for later decisions. Thus, these participants seem to be able to,
across time, focus their attention away from the irrelevant flankers, and onto the relevant
stimulus as compared to the participants with ADHD. To apply this interpretation to the current
work, this is evidence that inducing a stimulus bias increases the influence of categorical
information on the decision-making process but that this influence is suppressed for later
decisions. However, there is a critical breakdown in the analogy between the incongruent
flankers and the categorical, or gist, information of the stimuli used here. This comes from the
fact that participants conducting the flanker task are explicitly aware of the irrelevant nature of
the flankers. None-the-less, this irrelevant information influences their decision-making process.
But this allows for a clearer interpretation in that the explicit goal is to ignore the flankers, and
for example, participant without ADHD appear to be better at accomplishing this goal compared
to those with ADHD. Here, it is not made explicitly clear that categorical information is
irrelevant except for in the warning condition in Experiment 1. Therefore, the categorical
information could continue to exert influence over the decision-making process without
warranting any active suppression of this influence. That being said, it could be argued that the
warning was about the phenomenon in general, and not specific to the task at hand because they
were warned about the influence of category information without being explicitly informed of
the category they were to encounter during the actual test. Also, it may be a moot point because
it appears that this manipulation did not significantly change the propensity toward bias in favor
of responding “old” to the related words. Thus, even though participants may not have been
actively motivated to suppress categorical information, the delta plots reflect this interpretation.
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The standard DM cannot account for the pattern of data produced from the
aforementioned conflict tasks because of the constant drift rate representing a consistent rate of
evidence accumulation inherent in the standard DM (White, Ratcliff & Starns, 2011). This is
because the irrelevant information (e.g., flankers) has less of an influence over the decision
throughout the time course of the decision, thus requiring a time varying drift rate to account for
this data.
With this in mind, multiple adaptations of the standard DM have been proposed in
order to account for conflict task data. For example, White, Ratcliff & Starns (2011) proposed
the Spotlight Model which operationalizes the concept that attention gradually narrows in on the
stimulus of interest, depreciating the influence of the irrelevant flankers across time. Another
example is the Diffusion Model for Conflict tasks (DMC; Ulrich, Schröter, Leuthold &
Birngruber, 2015) where the overall rate of evidence accumulation is the summation of a
constant drift rate like that of the standard DM and another time varying contribution in the form
of a pulse function. Both of these models have been shown to successfully account for data from
conflict tasks. Importantly, this is accomplished because both of these models have parameters
that allow for the drift rate to vary across time, and thus can increase the rate of evidence
accumulation for the earliest decisions, and diminish this influence for later decisions, very much
like the data I have reported here.
These models were designed to model the change in visual attention when presented
with conflicting visual information. The general idea being that visual attention begins broadly,
including the irrelevant sometimes conflicting information, and gradually narrows in on the
stimulus of interest. These models could certainly be reframed in that the gradual focusing of
attention is mapped onto the internal consideration of specific attributes of the stimuli (e.g., from
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gist to verbatim), with early diffuse attention that includes the irrelevant (gist) information, and
later focused attention that only includes the relevant aspects. Thus, theoretically, these models
could be repurposed for use in the context of bias in simple memorial decisions.
It is important to note that the present work focused entirely on the DM. Along with
more complex versions of the DM, there are also other sequential sampling models, for example,
the Linear Ballistic Accumulator (LBA) (Brown & Heathcote, 2008). These models differ in
their structure and thus make subtly different predictions and/or can be applied to different
situations like decisions with more than two possible options. It would be interesting to produce
simulated DCVs and delta RT from these other models to see if the same overarching findings
are maintained. More generally, these analysis techniques could be used to compare predictions
not only across changes in parameters within models, but also between models as well.

Limitations
Experimental Design
The goal of these experiments was to induce different strengths of stimulus bias in
order to see how the pattern of RTs change when stimulus bias is more or less pronounced.
Unfortunately, proved to be more difficult than expected. For Experiment 1, the original intent
was to manipulate the strength of stimulus bias through the type of condition (divided attention,
normal or warning), however this did not result in the expected change in the C parameter
between these conditions. Fortunately, the addition of the blocked conditions was also included
in the hopes that it would result in diminished stimulus bias, as it appeared to. However, it is
possible that the reason for the difference in stimulus bias between the blocked and normal
conditions is better explained through changes in starting point. Conceptually, this means that
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block testing allows participants the chance to establish a separate decision criterion for related
and unrelated items. I did not inform participants of the type of words they were to encounter
(related or unrelated), thus participants would at the very least have to predict the type of word
that they would be presented with next, and fluidly adjust their criterion as their prediction
gained confidence. That being said, it is certainly possible that the reason for a difference in
stimulus bias between the normal and blocked conditions is not best characterized as a
diminished version of the same mechanism that results in the presence of stimulus bias overall.
With this in mind, future research should be focused on designing better ways to manipulate the
strength of stimulus bias between conditions.
Throughout this work I have attempted to convince the reader that there is noteworthy
similarity between bias in memory and conflict tasks. One important limiting issue here is in
acquiring data with a sufficient number of trials per participant. Simply, conflict tasks do not
require a study period, which of course comes with limits to human memory encoding, limiting
the number of trials that can be obtained in any given memory experiment. This is not an issue in
conflict tasks, as it is commonplace to administer conflict task experiments with 100s of trials
with relative ease. This becomes a particular issue when fitting computational models, especially
models with subtly different assumptions that would require many trials in order to separate
these different predictions. That was part of realized benefit of the DCV technique is that it does
not require actually fitting the DM. However, it was unable to separate the convergent account
from drift bias alone.
Analysis
Gajdos, Servant, Hasbroucq & Davranche (2019) describe issues with these
techniques which boil down to two main issues: First, the time course of the interference is
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informative and should not be lost in the analysis technique. Second, the strength of the
interference needs to be analyzed separately from the distribution (time course) of the
interference, otherwise they are conflated. This is critical because, for example, the slope of the
last segment of the delta plot is contingent on what came before it. Said another way, there can
be no suppression if there is no interference and the strength of suppression is contingent on the
strength of interference.

Final Summary
Here I have introduced a novel way to analyze data derived from simple memorial
decision tasks. Analyzing data from response bias memory experiments with the DCV allowed
for comparison of the predictions derived from the DM across changes in bias parameters with
the observed data in terms of the relative shape of correct response RT distributions. This
analysis pointed toward the divergent account; that bias in favor of one response impacts starting
point in favor of that response, and drift bias in the opposing direction. The DCV analysis
approach provides a way to structure data that focuses more directly on the impact that bias has
over the entirety of decisions by incorporating both types of correct response RTs to focus on
how they relate to each other, and how this relationship unfolds across conditions varying in
strength and direction of the bias manipulation.
I then use delta RT analysis to explore the time course of stimulus bias and find that,
overall, stimulus bias appears to impact earlier decisions, and that this influence is diminished for
later decisions. Importantly, it appears that in both cases, response and stimulus bias, there is
evidence that the influence of the bias impacts earlier decisions, but this influence is diminished,
or potentially opposed for later decisions. Thus, in order to better understand bias in simple
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memorial decisions, incorporating computational models with these mechanics might result in
better accounts of these data. Conceptually, these results suggest that however the bias is
manipulated (response or stimulus) the impact has a fluid component which changes across the
time course of decisions. Thus, our understanding of how these manipulations impact our
memorial decisions will benefit from the utilization of the sequential sampling models like the
Spotlight and DMC which have this fluid evidence accumulation feature. More broadly, thinking
of bias in memory as a sort of conflict can also provide a useful bridge to the conflict task
literature to begin taking advantage of the analysis techniques and conceptual interpretations and
applying them to shed light on how bias manipulations impact memorial decisions.
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